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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the ways in which cultural value predispositions impact decision-
making associated with hydraulic fracturing (fracking) among both local policy elites and the 
general public in Arkansas and Oregon. First, I examine the mediating role of (dis)trust in 
information provided by three groups associated with the fracking debate – the energy industry, 
environmental groups, and the government – in shaping benefit-risk perceptions associated with 
fracking, and compare this process between a sample of local policy elites and the general 
public in Arkansas and Oregon. Findings indicate that perceptions of trustworthiness are shaped 
by cultural value predispositions which, in turn, shape perceptions of benefits and risks 
associated with fracking. Further, this process is similar, yet distinct, between local policy elites 
and the general public, with trust – particularly distrust – playing a larger role in shaping benefit-
risk perceptions for local policy elites as compared to the general public. I then further examine 
the origins of trust in sources of information, focusing on local policy elites. For this, I introduce 
the concept of perceived value congruence – the extent to which an individual believes their 
values are congruent with the values of those in their community – to examine how the 
perceived fit of values between an individual and those of their community impacts the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in two distinct contexts, Arkansas 
and Oregon. Broadly, findings indicate that both perceived value congruence and the context an 
individual is nested in affect the relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in 
information provided by different sources. Finally, culturally nuanced narratives and knowledge 
(in)congruence – the degree to which an individual accurately assesses their knowledge levels 
of a given issue – are examined as moderators of the relationship between cultural value 
predispositions and fracking policy preferences. Results indicate that narratives impact the 
relationships between cultural value predispositions and policy preferences, but do not directly 
impact policy preferences. Further, cultural value predispositions impact fracking policy 
preferences differently for those overestimating their policy-relevant knowledge versus those 
underestimating their policy-relevant knowledge.  
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Introduction 
Cultural value predispositions have been found to influence a variety of outcomes, particularly 
perceptions of benefits and risks associated with a given policy or topic, as well as policy 
preferences. However, the mechanisms by which this influence occurs, as well as factors 
moderating this influence, have been largely unexamined. Thus, the three papers in the current 
dissertation focus on decision-making by examining the role of cultural value predispositions in 
the decision-making process in the context of hydraulic fracturing. The first paper examines the 
mediating role of trust in information provided by policy-relevant sources (i.e. the energy 
industry, environmental groups, and the government) on benefit-risk perceptions associated 
with fracking. Broadly, I argue that 1) the values that an individual holds shapes (dis)trust in 
information from sources whose values are seen as (in)congruent, and that the resulting 
(dis)trust, in turn, shapes benefit-risk perceptions and 2) this pattern of relationships is distinct 
between the general public and local policy elites. 
 The second paper focuses on further examining the relationship between cultural value 
predispositions and trust in information from policy-relevant sources. I introduce the concept of 
perceived value congruence – the degree to which an individual views their values as congruent 
with the values of those in their community – and examine how this concept influences the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust for local policy elites in two distinct 
contexts, Arkansas and Oregon. Generally, I argue that the impact of an individual’s personal 
values on trust in information is influenced by how the individual views their values to fit with 
those in the community in which the individual is nested. Further, I argue that these 
relationships are distinct in different contexts (i.e. Arkansas vs Oregon). Thus, this paper 
examines how the confluence of an individual’s values, their perceived values-based fit within 
the community, and the specific policy subsystem in which the individual is nested combine to 
shape trust levels in policy-relevant sources of information. 
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 The third paper takes a novel approach to the examination of policy narratives by 
examining how value congruent and incongruent narratives impact the relationship between 
cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences. Further, this paper examines how 
knowledge (in)congruence – the degree to which an individual accurately assesses their 
knowledge levels on a given issue – impacts the aforementioned relationships. Broadly, I argue 
that value (in)congruent narratives impact the relationship between cultural values and fracking 
policy preference. I further argue that those local policy elites with knowledge hubris (i.e. who 
overestimate their knowledge levels) will demonstrate a stronger relationship between cultural 
value predispositions and fracking policy preferences as compared to those with knowledge 
humility (i.e. who underestimate their knowledge levels) across narrative conditions.  
 Together, these three papers provide insights into the decision-making process broadly, 
as well as specific insights regarding the mechanisms by which values shape the decision-
making process and, ultimately, attitudes and preferences associated with hydraulic fracturing.  
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Cultural Values, Trust, and Benefit-Risk Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing: 
A Comparative Analysis of Policy Elites and the General Public 
 
Abstract: Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has recently become a very intensely debated 
process for extracting oil and gas. Supporters argue that fracking provides positive economic 
benefits and energy security and offers a decreased reliance on coal-based electricity 
generation. Detractors claim that the fracking process may harm the environment as well as 
place a strain on local communities that experience new fracking operations. This study utilizes 
a recently conducted survey distributed to a sample of policy elites and the general public in 
Arkansas and Oregon to examine the role of cultural value predispositions and trust in shaping 
the perceptions of risks and benefits associated with fracking. Findings indicate that cultural 
values influence both trust and benefit-risk perceptions of fracking for both policy elites and the 
general public. More specifically, we found that trust in information from various sources is 
derived from the intrinsic values held by an individual, which in turn impacts perceptions of 
related benefits and risks. We also found that while the overall pattern of relationships is similar, 
trust plays a larger role in the formulation of attitudes for policy elites than for the general public. 
We discuss the implications of the mediating role of trust in understanding value-driven benefit-
risk perceptions, as well as the disparate role of trust between policy elites and the general 
public in the context of the policy-making process for both theory and practice. 
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Introduction 
Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is a method of gas and oil extraction that involves a pressurized 
injection of a mixture of water, sand, and other chemicals through a drilled layer of rock in order 
to fracture the rock, thus facilitating the flow of gas and oil (Boudet et al. 2014; Pye 1973). A 
relatively newly utilized extraction technique, fracking has allowed for the extraction of oil and 
gas from previously inaccessible reserves around the world (Boudet et al. 2014; Clarke et al. 
2012; Walser, Pursell, and others 2007). This extraction technique is expected to increase the 
share of gas production from shale from 23% in 2010  (Administration (US) 2012) to almost two-
thirds of total production in the United States by 2040 (EIA - Annual Energy Outlook 2017 n.d.). 
 Those who support fracking argue that it will lead to many positive outcomes such as a 
more secure domestic energy supply, decreased dependence on coal-based and carbon 
intensive electricity generation, and increased economic growth (Boudet et al. 2014; Considine, 
Watson, and Blumsack 2010; Hultman et al. 2011). Indeed, the cost of natural gas has been 
estimated to have decreased by over 40% (Hausman and Kellogg 2015) and the share of coal-
generated electricity in the United States has experienced an approximately 13% drop 
(Christenson, Goldfarb, and Kriner 2017; EIA - Annual Energy Outlook 2017 n.d.). Results 
regarding economic benefits have thus far been mixed. In a national level study, fracking was 
estimated to account for approximately 550,000 new jobs. However, these jobs were largely 
concentrated to extractive industries and service sectors in those areas that have experienced 
the largest increases in fracking operations (Maniloff and Mastromonaco 2017). Other studies 
have shown relatively small positive impacts on local economies. For example, Paredes, 
Komarek, & Loveridge (Paredes, Komarek, and Loveridge 2015) use two methods to examine 
the effects of fracking on local employment and income in the Marcellus region and find only 
weak effects on employment and virtually no effects on income, concluding that, at the local 
level, incentives to incur future (potential) costs associated with fracking are minimal.  
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Fracking, however, is not without its detractors. While benefits such as increased local 
business and job opportunities for residents, along with increased local tax revenues, are 
argued to flow to local communities where fracking occurs (Boudet et al. 2014; Kay 2011), the 
community may also incur costs associated with an increase in the population of outside 
workers and industry that moves into the community, placing a strain on the community’s 
infrastructures (Boudet et al. 2014; J. Jacquet 2009). Water availability and access may become 
problematic in communities where fracking exists as well, as the fracking process utilizes 
between 2 and 10 million gallons of water per fracture (Boudet et al. 2014; Soeder and Kappel 
2009). The water used in the fracking process may also contaminate local water supplies 
through the inadequate treatment of wastewater, methane released from the gas well 
contaminating aquifers, and chemical spills (Boudet et al. 2014; Kargbo, Wilhelm, and Campbell 
2010). These risks have led to regulations regarding fracking at both the state and federal levels 
(Boudet et al. 2014; Groeger 2012). On a more social-psychological level, the strains on 
community infrastructures potentially induced by fracking operations have been argued to 
increase stress levels, decrease community cohesion and, due to employment seekers moving 
into the community, alter the community’s character thereby increasing social problems (Boudet 
et al. 2014; Brasier et al. 2011; Heikkila et al. 2014; Kester, Moyer, and Song 2015). 
Overall, the debate regarding the benefits and risks associated with fracking is 
predicated on fairly limited data, as the large-scale development of fracking operations has only 
recently occurred. The Environmental Protection Agency released a report examining hydraulic 
fracturing and the potential impacts it may have on drinking water resources, in which negative 
impacts have been found (e.g., surface water chemical contamination) or are possible to occur 
in given situations (e.g., groundwater chemical contamination) at various stages of the fracking 
process. Even within this report, the EPA acknowledges that there are significant gaps in the 
available data to draw reliable conclusions regarding the effects of fracking on drinking water 
resources (U.S EPA 2016). While there remain significant gaps in the available data for 
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estimating and understanding the specific costs and benefits associated with fracking, there is 
an emerging understanding of these outcomes. The largest economic benefit that has been 
associated with fracking has been in the reduction of gas prices, which has saved consumers 
an estimated $75 billion (Loomis and Haefele 2017). However, environmental costs have been 
estimated as being significant as well, with health issues associated with air pollution costs 
estimated at approximately $27 billion, $1 billion in the pollution of private drinking water wells, 
and $4 billion in the fragmentation of wildlife habitat (Loomis and Haefele 2017). Further, the 
benefits, both market and non-market, tend to be widely distributed geographically, while the 
costs, particularly non-market costs,  are localized to those areas experiencing fracking 
operations (Loomis and Haefele 2017). 
 With the contradictory views regarding the benefits and risks associated with fracking 
operations (as well as the thus far inconclusive empirical results associated with these 
suggested benefits and risks), and the relative newness of the method in the United States, 
understanding how attitudes toward fracking operations, such as benefit-risk perceptions, form 
among both policy elites and the general public  is of vital importance in an effort to understand 
policymaking associated with fracking. This paper, therefore, examines how both local policy 
elites and the general public formulate attitudes regarding the benefits and risks associated with 
fracking operations. Specifically, we investigate the role of trust in various information sources 
on an individual’s preference formation, focusing on how cultural value predispositions influence 
levels of trust in three information sources – the energy industry, environmental groups, and the 
government, and how these trust levels, in turn, affect benefit-risk perceptions associated with 
fracking operations. We utilize Cultural Theory (CT) (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990) to 
explain how the cultural value orientations of individuals shape perceptions of trust in 
information sources and, ultimately, related benefit-risk perceptions. Further, we examine how 
these relationships between cultural worldviews and trust are both similar and distinct between 
local policy elites and the general public in the determination of benefit-risk perceptions. Finally, 
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we discuss the implications of trust as a mediator between cultural value predispositions and 
benefit-risk perceptions for better understanding the policy process.  
 
Theories and Hypotheses 
Within the risk perception literature there are a multitude of factors affecting the perceptions of 
risks and benefits across a variety of domains. These include demographic characteristics 
(Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz 1994), knowledge level about a given risk or its source (Siegrist and 
Cvetkovich 2000), psychometric characteristics of risk (Slovic 1987), trust toward information 
sources associated with a given risk (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000), and the values of an 
individual, specifically cultural predispositions (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). In the following, a 
brief discussion on the relevant theoretical approaches to understand the benefit-risk 
perceptions associated with fracking operations held by local policy elites and the general public 
in Oregon and Arkansas1 will be provided. We will then postulate our hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between cultural value predispositions, trust in information sources, and benefit-
risk perceptions associated with fracking. Additionally, we will discuss and provide hypotheses 
regarding expected similarities and differences in these relationships between the general public 
and local policy elites.  
 
 
1 We purposefully select these two states and utilize samples drawn from the population of each state in 
the following analysis mainly because a national sample of the U.S. can be biased toward states with 
areas of high population density where there may be disproportionately low degrees of hydraulic 
fracturing operations and experiences, which can create a systemic bias in parameter estimations in our 
analysis. When making the case selection decision, we also considered that the political context between 
the two states is different, with Oregon representing a largely liberal state, and Arkansas representing a 
largely conservative state. Furthermore, the issue-based context is distinct, as Arkansas has fracking 
operations whereas Oregon lacks the shale formations necessary for fracking. The literature regarding 
the effects of proximity to fracking operations and perceptions of fracking is mixed.(Boudet et al. 2014; 
Bugden 2014; Clarke et al. 2016; J. B. Jacquet 2012) We therefore include the respondent’s state as a 
control variable in our analyses in order to more precisely estimate the effects of cultural value 
predispositions and trust in information sources on benefit-risk perceptions. Importantly, we have no 
expectations regarding proximity-based effects on perceptions of fracking, as the focus of this paper is on 
the decision-making process. Thus, while attitudes toward fracking may be different between the two 
states, we expect that the decision-making processes of individuals in each state will be the same/similar. 
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Demographics and Knowledge 
Demographic characteristics, particularly gender and race, have been previously demonstrated 
to be influential in determining an individual’s perceptions of risk. The “white male effect” has 
been demonstrated in multiple studies (Finucane et al. 2000). Males, as compared to females, 
in these studies have been shown to have consistently lower perceptions of risk in the domain 
of environmental health (Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz 1994). Similarly, in a variety of domains, white 
individuals have a demonstrated proclivity to express lower perceptions of risk than those who 
are not white (Finucane et al. 2000). This gender-based difference in perceptions of risk has not 
only been found in judgments of the general public, but has been demonstrated to exist in those 
who are considered to hold a more sophisticated level of knowledge and expertise as well. For 
example, perceived nuclear risk among male scientists has been found to be significantly less 
than risk perceptions held by female scientists (Barke, Jenkins-Smith, and Slovic 1997). It has 
been argued that these findings are derived from a value identity among white males in the 
United States that is rooted in hierarchism and individualism. This identity, which views the 
ecological system as resilient and values market-oriented entrepreneurship, helps to promote 
attitudes of risk-taking in assessments of science and technology utilization (Kahan, Jenkins-
Smith, and Braman 2011).  
Regarding fracking specifically, research examining public opinion has found 
demographic characteristics to be associated with support levels for fracking operations. Older 
individuals, as well as more highly educated individuals, have demonstrated higher levels of 
support for fracking operations (Boudet et al. 2014; Bugden 2014). Gender has also 
demonstrated a consistent effect on attitudes toward fracking operations, with females 
demonstrating lower levels of support for fracking operations than males (Boudet et al. 2014; 
Bugden 2014; Clarke et al. 2016). We similarly expect to find demographic-based variations in 
the assessments of both the general public and local policy elites on the potential benefits and 
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risks associated with fracking in Arkansas and Oregon, and thus incorporate related 
demographic variables in our empirical analysis that follows.  
 The level of knowledge that one holds regarding the sources of risk has also been 
suggested as justification for why benefit and risk perceptions are different across individuals 
(Wildavsky and Dake 1990). According to this “knowledge theory of risk perception,” more 
knowledgeable individuals possess greater capabilities in determining risks and thus make more 
objective and accurate evaluations of risk than those who are less knowledgeable. Most often, 
this concept has been examined as differences in the perceptions of risk between the general 
population and experts (who are assumed to possess more knowledge). Support for this 
“knowledge thesis” has been found in multiple risk domains such as nanotechnology (Siegrist et 
al. 2007), biotechnology (Savadori et al. 2004), and chemicals (Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic 
1992). Other studies claim, however, that methodological issues have tainted previous studies, 
leaving scant evidence in support of the thesis that risk judgments between experts and the 
general public are different (Rowe and Wright 2001). Despite this debate, the available evidence 
provides enough justification to consider that the level of knowledge held by an individual 
regarding energy issues potentially effects perceptions of benefits and risks of fracking 
operations among both the general public and local policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon. 
Indeed, within the fracking debate, those holding higher levels of knowledge regarding fracking 
have been shown to have more negative attitudes toward fracking, including higher perceptions 
of risks, in both the United States (Choma, Hanoch, and Currie 2016) and the United Kingdom 
(Howell 2018). 
Value Predispositions and Grid-Group Cultural Theory 
To examine our primary dependent variable of benefit and risk perceptions associated with 
fracking we utilize Grid-Group Cultural Theory (CT) (Swedlow 2011; Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990). Douglas and Wildavsky (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) argue that sustaining 
one’s cultural worldview or “way of life” is a key component in the development of risk 
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perceptions. Issues that would violate an individual’s enduring philosophical preferences (i.e., 
cultural worldview) are, therefore, those that are likely to be viewed as risky. Because of this, 
discussions around questions of risk are not confined to the debate’s technical aspects, but 
instead include sociopolitical components that are often associated with conceptions of 
desirable social functioning and structure (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Kahan et al. 2007). 
Indeed, in terms of predicting risk perceptions of individuals, CT has been found as robust as 
other theoretical perspectives including personality, and politically- and economically-oriented 
views across multiple domains, indicating support for the claim that risk perceptions are, at least 
in part, socially constructed (Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Xue et al. 2014).  
 The theoretical lens of socio-cultural construction has been utilized to examine 
individuals’ perceptions of risk across a variety of domains (H. Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; Jones 
and Song 2014; Moyer and Song 2015; Ripberger et al. 2012; Song 2014; Song, Silva, and 
Jenkins-Smith 2014). CT argues that cultural biases are shared through the social relationships 
of individuals (Ripberger et al. 2012; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). These shared 
biases shape individual behavior in many ways, including risk attention and risk taking 
preferences in various domains and contexts (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). CT 
utilizes two dimensions of social relations – grid and group – to develop a typology of four 
primary cultural worldviews (i.e., egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism). The 
“grid” dimension describes the extent to which an individual’s behavior is constrained by role 
differentiation whereas the “group” dimension focuses on how bound to their social group 
individuals view themselves to be (Ney and Verweij 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 
1990). The four value orientations that result from the grid-group dimensions function together 
as a system and are contradistinct to the others. These distinct worldviews enable contrasting 
perceptions of risk based on perceptions of the threat to the individual’s way of life.  
 Egalitarians (low grid-high group) are bound strongly to their social group while lacking 
role differentiation. Fairness and equity are highly valued and group cohesion is reinforced by a 
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tendency to distrust authority (Ellis and Thompson 1997). Egalitarians tend to have high 
perceptions of risk in the domains of economic growth and technological development, as these 
areas are perceived to threaten nature (which is viewed as fragile and easily damaged), making 
experimentation with nature necessarily avoided in an effort to manage and protect it (Dake 
1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
Individualists (low grid-low group) are bound by neither social groups nor rules and generally 
prefer a more libertarian society wherein risk is viewed as opportunity (Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990). Disliking external control, individualists view society as functioning best when 
everyone, the disadvantaged included, compete and, ultimately, succeed or fail as individuals. 
Individualists value a focus on wealth creation and view nature as robust and resilient, thus 
allowing for experimentation with the environment, as this experimentation allows for the pursuit 
of the “best possible” outcomes (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; 
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Hierarchs (high grid-high group) view both institutional 
and social rules as necessary for maintaining order and thus place value on both. Risks related 
to technology and the environment are often deemed acceptable, with experts being relied upon 
to guide the appropriate course for society.(Wildavsky and Dake 1990) As with individualists, 
hierarchs place a priority on wealth creation, but view obedience to authority as a key 
mechanism by which success can be attained. Again similar to individualists, hierarchs view 
nature as being fairly robust, but view regulations as necessary to prevent potential disasters 
from disrupting equilibrium and creating an unpredictable future (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, 
Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Finally, fatalists (high grid-
low group) are skeptical of their ability to control situations they encounter, being at the mercy of 
fate. Predictably, fatalists view nature as unpredictable and reliant on chance (Dake 1992; 
Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
 Within the issue of fracking, there is a dearth of research investigating the role of cultural 
values in benefit-risk perceptions and support. The limited previous research examining cultural 
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values and fracking perceptions have tended to examine only components of cultural values, 
examining only one or two of the cultural value predisposition types elaborated upon by cultural 
theory. Within that research, cultural value predispositions have received mixed results. 
Egalitarianism has been consistently found to lower support for fracking operations, whereas 
individualism has not demonstrated significant results.(Boudet et al. 2014; Bugden 2014) These 
studies, however, have not included examinations (or measures) of hierarchism or fatalism, 
important components in examining the role cultural value predispositions play in the 
development of benefit-risk perceptions. Indeed, in qualitative work utilizing a cultural theory 
framework to examine risk perceptions of oil and gas development, subjects have demonstrated 
justifications for benefit-risk perceptions that are in line with egalitarian, individualist, and 
hierarch worldviews.(McEvoy et al. 2017) 
Trust 
While often utilized in the examination of risk perceptions, trust has been conceptualized in 
many ways – both in terms of its origins and its effects on other variables of interest. While 
some take a cognitive approach to trust, considering it derived from an active choice of the 
trusting party after having weighed risks and benefits of having faith in the trustee’s actions with 
no control over them (Luhmann 2000), others focus on the social dimensions of trust. Social 
trust is suggested to be derived from perceptions of salient value similarity (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, 
and Roth 2000) which refers to the sense that an individual has in a given situation regarding 
which goals are important and/or which processes are appropriate to follow (Siegrist, 
Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000). Salient values are thus contextually based and therefore fluid 
between situations and contexts. Because of this, where trust originates from is context specific.  
 We apply a Cultural Theory perspective to Siegrist’s general approach to the origins of 
trust in a given source of information(Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000). Instead of fluid 
salient values determining trust, we argue that the cultural value predispositions held by an 
individual operate as a framework that helps to shape trust toward a given information source. 
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This view is in line with the concept of motivated reasoning, which argues that individuals 
selectively expose themselves to information sources that are perceived to be congruent with 
their beliefs (Jones and Song 2014; Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2007; Taber and Lodge 
2006). Within motivated reasoning, individuals experience confirmation bias, in which greater 
credit is given to congruent evidence that confirms held beliefs, and disconfirmation bias, in 
which incongruent information is denied or ignored completely (Taber and Lodge 2006). In this 
way, the quality or accuracy of a given piece of information diminishes in importance, as the 
quality and accuracy of the information is determined not by a neutral assessment of 
information, but is instead shaped by (dis)confirmation biases held by the individual.(Kahan, 
Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011) In sum, then, we expect that motivated reasoning processes 
will lead to trust in an information source due to perceptions of congruence between the 
information source and the cultural value predispositions held by the individual, as opposed to a 
reliance on the quality or accuracy of the information2.  
 In empirical examinations on the influence of trust on benefit-risk perceptions, trust in 
authorities has been found to influence perceptions across a variety of risk domains (Barnes 
2002; Heitz et al. 2009; Njome et al. 2010; Terpstra 2010; Viklund 2003) and is argued to be 
used as a proxy for rational decision making by allowing individuals to rely on information from 
those whose views they deem as accurate, thereby decreasing the cognitive load in decision 
making (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000; Wachinger et al. 2013) and aiding in the development of 
benefit-risk perceptions. We expect cultural values to influence trust in a similar fashion, as 
those who are perceived to share an individual’s values are likely to be categorized as honest 
and having high levels of integrity, whereas those who hold disparate values will be deemed as 
 
2 The current context of perceptions of fracking benefits and risks represents a situation in which quality 
and accuracy of information are particularly subjective, as the technology is relatively new and the results 
of various empirical work on its benefits and risks have, as discussed above, been largely mixed. Thus, 
the perceived accuracy and quality of information is likely to be subjective, and at least partially derived 
from trust in information sources.  
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having low levels of integrity and being (relatively) dishonest, in turn reinforcing the cultural 
biases held by the individual (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).  
Local Policy Elites versus the General Public 
As discussed above, knowledge has been argued and found to exhibit effects on perceptions of 
risks and benefits, though these findings have been debated. As we are comparing the general 
public and local policy elites in the current study, we are interested in knowledge at the 
individual level as well as between samples3. For the purposes of the current paper, then, the 
potential differences between the general public and local policy elites is important, particularly 
in terms of political sophistication and decision-making. Because of their position, we can expect 
local policy elites to be relatively high in political sophistication as compared to the general 
public. Elites are different from the general public in that they generally have higher education 
levels, are more knowledgeable in the realm of politics, and have higher incomes (Edinger and 
Searing 1967; Griffin 2013; Jennings 1992; Lawless and Fox 2005). Additionally, the 
consistency and strength of the political attitudes held by elites is also higher than those of the 
general public (Converse 1964; Hetherington 2001), demonstrating that elites are different from 
the public in both demography and political sophistication levels.  
Political sophistication represents highly differentiated, integrated, and organized political 
knowledge (Campbell 1980; Converse 1964; Luskin 1990). Further, as political knowledge 
increases in range and scope, political belief systems become more coherent. When political 
sophistication is low, coherent and consistent policy preferences are less likely to be formed 
because of these inconsistent political belief systems (Carpini and Keeter 1997; Converse 1964; 
Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2009; Stimson 1975; Zaller 1992). The relationship between 
 
3 It is important to distinguish between two conceptualizations of knowledge in the current paper. The 
previously discussed conceptualization of knowledge occurs at the individual level and is related directly 
to the policy issue – in the current study, fracking. The second conceptualization of knowledge is 
considered at a more aggregate level, and is represented by the two separate samples – the general 
public, and local policy elites. This second knowledge conceptualization is not necessarily related to a 
given issue, but to the processes that occur around policy-making in general. 
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political orientations and policy positions has indeed been demonstrated to be more robust with 
higher levels of political sophistication (Carpini and Keeter 1997; Goren 2004; Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992). Policy elites are relatively experienced in the political 
process compared to the general public due to their power, broadly defined, and position, likely 
holding high political sophistication levels and, in turn, affecting how they make decisions (Chin, 
Bond, and Geva 2000). Indeed, in the context of international trade, differences were found in 
the decision-making processes of elites and the general public with elites utilizing neoclassical 
economic reasoning and the public using neorealist or Rawlsian reasoning in their decision-
making (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). Compared to the general public, elites also tend 
to indicate lower levels of loss aversion (Haigh and List 2005; Plott and Zeiler 2007) and to 
better use heuristics in decision-making (Feltovich, Prietula, and Ericsson 2006; Mintz 2004; 
Zimmerman and Campillo 2003). 
 However, functioning as cognitive heuristics, core values and beliefs have been argued 
to allow individuals with low political sophistication levels to make political judgments that are 
both consistent and coherent by reducing the cognitive load associated with information search, 
thus allowing for coherent political belief systems to exist regardless of political sophistication 
levels (Goren 2004; Popkin 1994). Indeed, cultural value orientations have been demonstrated 
to represent intrinsic values that predict political attitudes and policy preferences separate from 
the effects of left-right political ideology – a finding that holds across levels of political 
sophistication (Gastil et al. 2011; Ripberger et al. 2012). Thus, while there is evidence that 
decision-making processes and political sophistication levels may differ between policy elites 
and the general public, there is at least some evidence that, due to cultural value 
predispositions, outcomes in terms of policy preferences and benefit-risk perceptions may be 
similar between the two groups.  
 
 
16 
 
 
Hypotheses 
The focus of this study is two-fold. First is examining the role that trust in information sources 
plays in the relationship between cultural value predispositions and benefit-risk perceptions of 
hydraulic fracturing. Second is examining the differences and similarities in this relationship 
between local policy elites and the general public. Fracking operations have been argued to be 
both very beneficial and very risky in the domains of the economy and the environment. We 
therefore expect that disparate cultural value orientations in both the local policy elite and 
general public samples will demonstrate significantly different benefit and risk perceptions 
related to fracking practices.  
 As egalitarians perceive high risk levels in the technological development and economic 
growth domains due to their view of nature as being easily damaged and fragile, we expect 
them to perceive higher levels of risk associated with fracking operations. Alternatively, because 
both individualists and hierarchs are accepting of risks and view nature as robust, we expect 
those holding these two cultural worldviews to perceive lesser risks and greater benefits 
associated with fracking operations as compared to those holding views more aligned with 
egalitarianism and/or fatalism. We expect no particular relationship with fracking benefit-risk 
perceptions for fatalists, as they view outcomes as left to chance.  
 For our examination of trust in information sources, we utilize three different sources of 
information – the energy industry, environmental conservation groups, and government 
agencies. For strong egalitarians, we hypothesize (a) distrust in the energy industry, viewing 
them as hazardous for the environment and (b) trust in environmental conservation groups, 
viewing them as sharing values based on the need to protect a vulnerable ecosystem. In 
contrast, we hypothesize that strong individualists will (a) trust the energy industry, viewing it as 
representing entrepreneurship and market-based competition and (b) distrust environmental 
groups and government agencies, viewing each as attempting to place limits on individual 
liberties. Strong hierarchs are expected to (a) trust both the energy industry and government 
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agencies, with both representing authority and expertise in their given field and (b) distrust 
environmental groups, viewing them as deviant in terms of recognizing institutional authority. 
Lastly, we have no expectations for strong fatalists in terms of relationships with trust in various 
information sources due to their apathy and detachment from policy deliberation(Trousset et al. 
2015).  
 Based on our previous discussion, we expect several key relationships between trust in 
information sources and benefit-risk perceptions regarding fracking operations. First, we expect 
trust in the energy industry to be associated with an increase in perceived benefits associated 
with fracking (as compared to risks). Alternatively, we expect trust in environmental groups to 
increase perceived risks associated with fracking (as compared to benefits). Finally, we expect 
that trust in government agencies will increase perceptions of benefits (as compared to risks).  
 Regarding the broader focus of this study – the mediating role of trust in the relationship 
between cultural value predispositions and benefit-risk perceptions regarding fracking – we 
generally expect trust in information sources to mediate the relationship between cultural values 
and benefit-risk perceptions. Further, we expect the patterns of mediation across the four 
cultural orientations (i.e. egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism) to be distinct, 
as we expect each cultural worldview to hold different perceptions of benefits and risks, partially 
due to differing levels of (dis)trust in information sources. Specifically, we expect egalitarians to 
perceive higher levels of risks (as compared to benefits) via their trust in information from 
environmental groups and distrust in information from the energy industry. For individualists, we 
expect higher perceived benefits (as compared to risks) via trust in information from the energy 
industry and distrust in information from environmental groups and the government. For 
hierarchs, we expect higher levels of perceived benefits (as compared to risks) via trust in 
information from the government and energy industry and distrust in information from 
environmental groups. As discussed, we have no particular expectations for fatalists.  
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 Finally, we expect the patterns of mediation between the two samples – local policy 
elites and the general public in Arkansas and Oregon – to be similar. However, we expect that, 
based on our discussion above regarding policy elites and sophistication, the mediating effect 
will be (generally) stronger in the local policy elite sample than in the general population sample. 
Figure 1 summarizes the general relationships between key variables discussed in this section. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Data, Variables, and Measures 
Survey Data 
To test these hypotheses, we used our original data, collected from statewide Internet surveys 
that were distributed to local policy elites as well as the general public in both Arkansas and 
Oregon between December 2015 and January 2016. Qualtrics, a reputable survey research and 
sampling company, provided the general public sample in Arkansas and Oregon. A total of 
1,145 survey participants were recruited in a manner by which their demographic characteristics 
approximate national census characteristics. As for the local policy elites in the two states, a 
total of 657 responses were collected. Local policy elites were conceptualized as individuals 
who hold political resources as well as the potential capability to hold influence throughout the 
policy process at the local level (Moyer and Song 2016; Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2017). 
More specifically, those who are more likely to be involved in the policy process regarding 
energy policy issues were targeted. The sample therefore consisted of various city government 
officials including mayors, clerks, council members, and other government officials, as well as 
members of local chamber of commerce organizations. A proper Institutional Review Board 
approval for our survey study and overall research plan for the protection of involved human 
research subjects was obtained before fielding the survey.  
The local policy elite data set demonstrated itself as distinctly different from the general 
population sample. Such differences included higher income and education, as well as being 
more predominately White males when compared to the general public sample (see Table I). 
19 
 
 
(Table I about here) 
Dependent Variable and Measures 
The primary dependent variable in this analysis was the perceived benefits and risks associated 
with fracking held by policy elites and the general public. This variable was operationalized by 
utilizing an eleven-item survey measure that asked questions regarding various risks and 
benefits associated with fracking. A composite measure of benefit-risk perceptions was 
developed from the eleven items – the arithmetical mean of the eleven items – which consisted 
of five benefit (reverse-coded) and six risk items that addressed economic, environmental, and 
health issues potentially associated with fracking (see Table II). All items were measured on an 
eleven-point scale that assessed perceived levels of benefit (or risk) with higher scores 
indicating greater perceptions of risks and lower perceptions of benefits. The items exhibited 
high reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.92 for elites and 0.90 for the general public sample4. 
(Table II about here) 
Independent Variables, Mediator Variables, and Measures 
The primary independent variables for this analysis are the cultural value predispositions (i.e., 
egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism) held by the individual. We utilized a 
previously validated scale that consisted of a total of twelve items – three items representing 
each of the four value orientations (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2014; Jones and Song 2014; 
Ripberger et al. 2014; Song 2014; Song, Silva, and Jenkins-Smith 2014)(see Table III). Survey 
respondents rated their level of agreement with each of the twelve items on a seven-point scale 
that ranged from 1 (=Strongly disagree) to 7 (=Strongly agree). A factor analysis that optimized 
 
4 We conducted a factor analysis for the benefit and risk items for both the elite and public samples. In 
both, two factors were derived – one containing the benefit items, and the other containing the risk items. 
We conducted the same analyses as currently presented with the combined index (i.e. risk and benefit 
indexes as separate dependent variables). These analyses demonstrated similar results as the analysis 
presented here utilizing the full benefit-risk index, with only small differences in estimated effect sizes. 
Overall, the findings were the same. We thus only present the results of the combined benefit-risk index 
analyses.  
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the four-factor solution was then conducted on the results of the twelve Cultural Theory items in 
which each of the three CT items was loaded onto one of the four latent dimensions, with these 
dimensions matching the four cultural orientations offered by Cultural Theory. We then 
calculated factor scores for each of these four latent dimensions and used these scores as a 
measure of the cultural orientations of each respondent. Cronbach’s alpha scores ranged from 
0.67 to 0.79 for an acceptable range of reliability.  
(Table III about here) 
Our mediating variables – levels of trust toward information from the energy industry, 
environmental groups, and government – were measured by asking our respondents the degree 
to which they trusted each source for information on energy issues, particularly as related to 
fracking (see Table IV). Respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in information from 
each group on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 (=No trust whatsoever) to 10 (=Completely 
trust). Higher levels of perceived trustworthiness from a given information source are indicated 
by higher scores on this scale.5 
(Table IV about here) 
Control Variables and Measures 
For control variables, we utilized other constructs that have previously been claimed to affect 
benefit-risk perceptions (see Table V). These include demographic characteristics, such as race 
(1=Non-Hispanic White; 0=Others), gender (1=Male; 0=Female), age (age in years), education 
(level of education; 1=Elementary through some high school to 7=Doctorate (of any type)), 
income (total estimated annual household income; 1=less than $20,000 to 9=$300,000 or 
more), and state (1=Arkansas; 0=Oregon), as well as the knowledge level an individual holds on 
 
5 The three trust variables were included as separate variables (as opposed to being combined into a 
scale) in order to isolate the mediating effects of trust for each entity (i.e. government, environmental 
groups, energy industry). Cronbach’s alpha for the three trust variables was 0.34, indicating very low 
internal consistency among the three trust variables. As such, there are both theoretical and empirical 
distinctions between our three trust variables. 
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the topic. To measure knowledge levels of respondents we asked a series of seven true/false 
questions related to various energy and fracking issues in the relevant state (i.e., Arkansas or 
Oregon) and calculated the percentage of correct answers in their responses to create a 
knowledge index, with higher scores indicating higher levels of knowledge. In an effort to 
account for various policy relevant types of knowledge, these items were designed to measure 
two broad types of fracking related knowledge. The first is related to energy and fracking law, 
both nationally and in the respondent’s state. The second is related to non-legal facets of 
fracking and energy knowledge, such as knowledge about natural gas reserves and fracking 
operations (see Table V). In both the policy elite and general public samples, Cronbach’s alpha 
for these items was 0.59, indicating moderate reliability of the items. 
(Table V about here) 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
For our primary analysis of interest6, we utilized causal mediation analysis as outlined by 
Preacher and Hayes (Preacher and Hayes 2004) and Hayes (Hayes 2013) to test our 
hypotheses regarding the triadic relationships between cultural orientations, trust in information 
sources, and fracking benefit-risk perceptions among local policy elites and the general public in 
 
6 Before conducting our primary analysis, we utilized Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in order to 
examine the effects of our independent variables on our mediator variables (i.e., trust in government, trust 
in environmental groups, and trust in the energy industry), as well as the effects of our independent and 
mediator variables on fracking benefit-risk perceptions for both local policy elites (see Appendix 2) and 
the general public (see Appendix 3). Respondents from Arkansas (as opposed to Oregon) in the general 
public sample demonstrated higher levels of trust in information from both environmental groups and the 
energy industry, as well as higher levels of perceived benefits of fracking operations. For the local policy 
elite sample, none of these relationships were significant at the level of p<0.05. Actual knowledge levels 
had no significant effect on any of our variables of interest aside from trust in information from the energy 
industry in the general public sample, in which higher knowledge levels decrease trust in the energy 
industry. We also conducted a Welch two sample t-test on knowledge levels between the two samples. 
The mean knowledge score for local policy elites was 0.5, while the mean score for the general public 
was 0.45. This difference was statistically significant (p<0.01), but smaller than expected. Further, we 
conducted a Welch two sample-test on knowledge levels between the two states (i.e., Arkansas vs. 
Oregon) for both the local policy elite and general public samples. For both samples, respondents from 
Arkansas had significantly higher knowledge scores than respondents from Oregon (p<0.01). In the local 
policy elite sample, the mean knowledge score for Arkansas respondents was 0.62 whereas the mean 
score for Oregon respondents was 0.45. In the general public sample the mean knowledge score for 
Arkansas respondents was 0.56, whereas the mean knowledge score for Oregon respondents was 0.35. 
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Arkansas and Oregon. For this, we used the “allstatGUI” package in R, which allowed us to 
estimate the effects of the four CT variables (Primary independent variables (X)) on fracking 
benefit-risk perceptions (Primary dependent variables (Y)) via each of the three trust variables 
(Mediator variables (M)) while controlling for demographic characteristics and knowledge level. 
The analysis described by Preacher and Hayes is based on sequential OLS regression 
estimations and allows for multiple mediator variables that operate in parallel. The detailed 
analytical results are reported in Table VI (for the general public) and Table VII (for elites), with 
a more succinct visualization of the results demonstrated in Figure 2 (for the general public) and 
Figure 3 (for elites)7. 
(Tables VI and VII and Figures 2 and 3 about here) 
Egalitarianism, Trust, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions 
For the general public (see Table VI and Figure 2), our measure of egalitarianism is positively 
related with our benefit-risk index. As egalitarianism scores increase risk perceptions associated 
with fracking operations also increase. Egalitarianism is negatively related to trust in the energy 
industry, which has a negative relationship with our benefit-risk index. This indicates a positive 
indirect effect of egalitarianism on risks associated with fracking operations via levels of trust in 
the energy industry, such that as egalitarianism scores increase, trust in the energy industry 
decreases, leading to higher perceptions of risks for the general public sample. Egalitarianism 
is, conversely, positively related to trust in environmental groups, which is, in turn, positively 
associated with our benefit-risk index. Thus, we find that trust in environmental groups as a 
 
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for mentioning that knowledge levels held by individuals may impact 
the relationships under examination. Using Model 7 from the same statistical package, we examined 
whether actual knowledge levels affected the mediation patterns under examination, wherein the 
mediated effect was tested at the mean knowledge level and 1 standard deviation above/below the mean 
knowledge level. We found no notable differences in mediation patterns due to knowledge levels held by 
individuals. The only mediated effect that was found to be different based on knowledge level was for 
fatalism in the policy elite sample, wherein the mediated effect of fatalism on benefit-risk perceptions via 
trust in information from the energy industry was significant at the mean and 1 standard deviation below 
the mean of actual knowledge scores, but not significant at 1 standard deviation above the mean 
knowledge score. Thus, consistently across both the elite and general public samples, the discussed 
relationships that follow occur across actual knowledge levels. 
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source of information has a positive mediating effect on egalitarianism’s relationship with 
fracking benefit-risk perceptions, such that as egalitarianism scores increase, trust in 
environmental groups increases, leading to higher perceptions of risk. 
 Similar relationships were found for the policy elite sample (see Table VII and Figure 3). 
Egalitarianism was found to have a significant positive direct effect on our benefit-risk index. As 
with the general public sample, egalitarianism is negatively related to trust in the energy industry 
and positively related to trust in environmental groups, which are negatively and positively 
related to our benefit-risk index, respectively. These relationships indicate a positive indirect 
effect on fracking risk perceptions via lower levels of trust in the energy industry and higher 
levels of trust in environmental groups, resulting in higher perceptions of risks as compared to 
benefits as egalitarianism scores increase.  
 For both the general public and policy elite samples, egalitarian scores were positively 
related with trust in the government. However, trust in government had no significant effect on 
fracking benefit-risk perceptions in either sample, indicating no mediating effect of trust in 
government on the relationship between egalitarianism and fracking benefit-risk perceptions. 
Overall, all hypotheses regarding strong egalitarians were supported for both the public and 
policy elite samples.  
Individualism, Trust, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions 
For the general public sample (see Table VI and Figure 2), there was a negative direct effect of 
individualism on benefit-risk perceptions of fracking such that as individualism scores increase, 
perceptions of risks as compared to benefits of fracking decrease. Additionally, there was a 
significant mediation effect of both trust in the energy industry and trust in environmental groups 
on the relationship between individualism and fracking benefit-risk perceptions. Individualism is 
positively associated with trust in the energy industry while being negatively related to trust in 
environmental groups. As previously discussed, trust in the energy industry and trust in 
environmental groups hold a negative and positive relationship with fracking benefit-risk 
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perceptions, respectively, indicating a negative indirect effect of individualism on benefit-risk 
perceptions such that higher individualism scores increase trust in the energy industry and 
decrease trust in environmental groups which causes an increase in perceptions of benefits as 
compared to risks of fracking operations.  
 As with egalitarianism, similar results were found in the policy elite sample (see Table VII 
and Figure 3). There is a significant negative direct effect on fracking benefit-risk perceptions. 
Further, as individualism scores increase, trust in the energy industry increases whereas trust in 
environmental groups decreases, each in turn leading to greater perceptions of benefits as 
compared to risks associated with fracking operations. 
 Conversely to egalitarianism, individualism was negatively related to trust in the 
government as a source of information for both the general public and policy elites. However, as 
mentioned, trust in the government indicated no relationship with fracking benefit-risk 
perceptions in either sample, indicating no mediating effect. Overall, all hypotheses regarding 
strong individualists were supported in both the public and policy elite samples with the 
exception of trust in government as a partial mediator between individualism and benefit-risk 
perceptions. 
Hierarchism, Trust, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions 
In the general public sample (see Table VI and Figure 2), hierarchism scores had a significant 
negative relationship with fracking benefit-risk perceptions, as expected. As hypothesized, 
hierarchism is positively related to trust in the energy industry, which is negatively related to 
fracking benefit-risk perceptions, indicating a significant negative indirect effect of hierarchism 
on benefit-risk perceptions via trust in the energy industry, such that as hierarchism scores 
increase, trust in the energy industry increases, leading to higher levels of perceived benefits as 
compared to risks. In the general public sample, hierarchism demonstrated no relationship with 
trust in environmental groups, thus no mediating effect was indicated.  
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 For the policy elite sample (see Table VII and Figure 3), hierarchism had no direct 
relationship with fracking benefit-risk perceptions – counter to the general public sample and our 
hypothesis. Similar to the general public sample (and as hypothesized), the elite sample 
indicated that hierarchism is positively associated with trust in the industry, indicating a negative 
indirect effect such that as hierarchism scores increase, perceptions of benefits as compared to 
risks associated with fracking decrease, partially due to increased trust in the energy industry. 
Counter to the general public sample, the policy elite sample indicated a negative relationship 
between hierarchism scores and trust in environmental groups, as expected. This relationship 
indicates a significant negative indirect effect of hierarchism on benefit-risk perceptions via 
lower levels of trust in environmental groups as hierarchism scores increase, such that as 
hierarchism scores increase, trust in environmental groups decrease, leading to higher levels of 
perceived benefits.  
 Somewhat counter-intuitively (and counter to our hypotheses), hierarchism had no 
relationship with trust in government in either the general public or policy elite samples. 
Fatalism, Trust, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions 
For the general public sample (see Table VI and Figure 2), fatalism was positively associated 
with fracking benefit-risk perceptions, indicating that as fatalism scores increase, perceived risks 
(as compared to benefits) increases as well. Fatalism also had a positive relationship with both 
trust in the energy industry and trust in environmental groups. This indicates a negative indirect 
effect of fatalism on benefit-risk perceptions via trust in the energy industry and a positive 
indirect effect of fatalism on benefit-risk perceptions via trust in environmental groups.  
 For fatalism, there were several differences between the policy elite (see Table VII and 
Figure 3) and general public sample. Counter to the general public, there was no direct effect of 
fatalism on fracking benefit-risk perceptions. Similar to the general public sample, fatalism in the 
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elite sample8 did have a positive relationship with trust in environmental groups, indicating a 
positive indirect effect of fatalism on benefit-risk perceptions via trust in environmental groups. 
Counter to the general public sample, in the policy elite sample fatalism was negatively related 
to trust in the energy industry, indicating a significant positive indirect effect of fatalism on 
fracking benefit-risk perceptions via trust in the energy industry.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Generally, this research provides evidence that cultural value predispositions influence benefit-
risk perceptions at least partially through their influence on trust in various information sources. 
Further, this study indicates that while the patterns of mediation are largely similar between local 
policy elites and the general public, the degree to which trust is a factor differs between the two 
groups, with trust having a stronger mediating effect for local policy elites than for the general 
public. Specifically, we found that for both local policy elites and the general public, as 
egalitarianism scores increase, perceptions of risk (as compared to benefits) increased as well, 
partially due to egalitarians’ propensity to trust information from environmental groups and to 
distrust information from the energy industry. Alternatively, an increase in individualism scores 
indicated an increase in perceptions of benefits (as compared to risks), partially due to 
individualists’ propensity to trust information from the energy industry and distrust environmental 
groups. For hierarchs and fatalists, trust in information sources operated somewhat differently 
between the two samples, which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 This study provides several implications for both theory and practice. First, this study 
further extends our understandings of the role(s) that trust plays in developing attitudes toward a 
 
8 Of note, the existence of fatalists among policy elites appears somewhat surprising given their views on 
outcomes being a function of chance and being indifferent towards government, which represents a 
collective action.(Swedlow 2001) While outside of the scope of the current paper, institutional dynamics 
that may promote or lead to fatalistic approaches and attitudes among political elites have been 
examined.(6 2016; Entwistle et al. 2016; Nakamura 2016)   
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controversial energy extraction practice. Further, it elaborates on the similarities and differences 
of these relationships between two distinct groups of critical importance in the related 
policymaking process – local policy elites and the general public. While cultural value 
predispositions have been shown to affect the benefit-risk perceptions that individuals hold in a 
variety of domains (Jones and Song 2014; Moyer and Song 2015; Song 2014), the causal 
mechanism by which these relationships occur has, at best, been under-examined and under-
specified. There has been some experimental work that has demonstrated that the perceived 
congruence of cultural values between the individual and experts providing information interact 
to predict an individual’s views of expert credibility and risk perceptions (Kahan et al. 2007, 
2008, 2010; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011). Our analyses find little to no evidence 
that an interaction between cultural value predispositions and trust in an information source 
leads to benefit-risk perceptions. Instead, we find trust to be derived from cultural values, in turn 
shaping benefit-risk perceptions. It is possible that the experimental nature of previous studies 
found significant results by creating an artificial environment in which cultural fit was 
manipulated in such a way as to maximize cultural distinctions between information providers 
that simply does not occur in reality, leading to statistically significant results. In the real world, 
determining cultural values, and thus cultural value fit, may be much more difficult than in an 
experimentally manipulated environment in which information on an issue is not sought by an 
individual, but is instead provided, with cultural value characteristics of the source of information 
explicitly given. While much of the current research in this area has been experimental, 
examining interaction effects, there is some previous research that has also demonstrated 
similar results to the current study in which there is a causal process (as opposed to an 
interactive one) where trust mediates the relationship between cultural values and benefit-risk 
perceptions (Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2017). Similar to these results, we find that, unlike 
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other previous work, trust appears to be an outcome of cultural value predispositions9, in turn 
influencing benefit-risk perceptions. Thus, it does not seem that individuals base benefit-risk 
perceptions necessarily upon the evaluated fit of cultural values between themselves and the 
information provider, but instead likely seek those information providers who are perceived to 
have similar value orientations. Overall, based on the current results, it appears that (dis)trust is 
given to information providers particularly because of the (dis)similar values that the information 
provider appears to hold, which in turn influences the pathway by which perceptions of benefits 
and risks are established.  
 The current study also extends our understanding of the mediating role of trust in the 
relationship between cultural values and benefit-risk perceptions by comparing this relationship 
between two groups both critical to comprehending the collective decision-making process (i.e., 
local policy elites and the general public). Previous work found trust to be a mediating factor in 
this relationship among local policy elites in the case of High Voltage Power Line (HVPL) 
installation (Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2015). The current paper extends this work by 
examining a different energy-related issue (i.e., hydraulic fracturing) and comparing the role of 
trust between local policy elites and the general public. In the context of local policy elites, our 
findings differ in several meaningful ways. First, in the current research, trust in government had 
no mediating effect on benefit-risk perceptions, whereas in the case of HVPLs, trust in 
government had a mediating effect for individualists, egalitarians, and fatalists. These disparate 
results may very well be due to the difference in the nature of policy issues. As discussed, 
fracking has recently become a fairly controversial issue nationwide, accompanied by expanded 
government regulations at the state and local levels, making it perhaps a more ubiquitous policy 
issue than that of HVPL installation, which likely only enters the public’s awareness when it is 
perceived to directly affect an individual or community.  
 
9 See Appendices 2 and 3  
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 The current work also finds interesting results in the comparison of the local policy elites 
and the general public. The results for egalitarians and individualists for both groups were 
largely similar. A key distinction is that in the local policy elite sample, distrust exhibited a much 
stronger mediating effect than in the general population sample (see Table VIII). For 
egalitarians, trust in environmental groups had fairly similar mediation effect sizes, whereas the 
effect size for distrust in the energy industry was more than three times larger in the local policy 
elite sample than in the general public sample. Conversely, for individualists, trust in the energy 
industry exhibited almost identical mediation effect sizes between the two samples, whereas 
distrust in environmental groups demonstrated a mediation effect size for local policy elites that 
is almost five times larger than that of the general public (see Table VIII). 
(Table VIII about here) 
 Hierarchism and fatalism both had conflicting results when comparing the mediating 
effects of trust in information sources between the local policy elite and general public samples. 
For local policy elites, trust had a negative mediating effect on benefit-risk perceptions for both 
environmental groups and the energy industry. However, only trust in the energy industry 
demonstrated a mediating effect for hierarchism in the general population sample. For fatalism, 
trust in environmental groups had a positive mediating effect that was similar in size for both 
local policy elites and the general public samples. However, trust in the energy industry 
provided very contrasting results. For local policy elites, trust in the energy industry had a 
positive mediating effect, with higher fatalism scores being associated with higher levels of trust 
in the energy industry, in turn increasing perceptions of benefits as compared to risks. For the 
public, the inverse is true. For this sample, there was a negative mediating effect of trust in the 
energy industry with higher fatalism scores associated with lower levels of trust in the energy 
industry, leading to higher perceptions of risks as compared to benefits.  
 These disparate results between local policy elites and the general public call for further 
research, as the authors have found no work elaborating justifications for such distinctions. It is 
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possible that these results are due to different types of interactions with policy and the 
policymaking process that each of these groups encounter, with policy elites holding different 
experiences in dealings with the diverse entities associated with various groups than the 
general public, such as having both more frequent and more intimate contact with all three of 
these potential sources of information. Alternatively, the distinctions between the process of 
attitude formation between local policy elites and the general public may occur on some policy 
issues, but not others.  
In considering the inconsistencies with the mediation analysis results between the two 
samples, the benefit-risk perceptions themselves become particularly important, as differing 
perceptions of benefits and risks associated with fracking may help to explain the differences in 
mediation patterns between local policy elites and the general public. We conducted a Welch 
two sample t-test to examine the differences between benefit-risk perceptions of the two groups. 
For local policy elites, the mean benefit-risk score was 3.47, while for the general public the 
mean score was 3.63, indicating higher perceptions of risks (as compared to benefits) 
associated with fracking among the general public sample. However, this difference was not 
statistically significant, indicating that there is no particular evidence that the perceptions of risks 
and benefits associated with fracking operations are particularly different between local policy 
elites and the general public. Thus, it is not attitudes concerning fracking operations that are 
different between local policy elites and the general public, but the process by which these 
attitudes are reached that is distinct.  Future research examining these distinctive processes 
would therefore be beneficial in order to understand the various mechanisms by which policy 
preferences are not only formed, but can possibly be changed – among both policy elites and 
the general population.  
While we believe that the current work takes a significant step toward better 
understanding the decision-making process for both local policy elites and the general public in 
the context of a controversial environmental and energy policy issue, it is not without limitations. 
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First, there may be issues due to our sampling strategy. For local policy elites, there may be a 
non-response bias at play. For the general population sample, our use of Qualtrics for 
participant recruitment may have provided us with a non-representative sample. Thus, there 
may be issues of external validity of our findings. However, these issues are common to survey 
methodology, and are likely to be no more problematic than any other research utilizing similar 
methods. That said, future work utilizing other methodologies would be beneficial to further 
examine the attitudes and processes explored here. Second, as mentioned earlier, we utilized a 
sample from two states – one with fracking operations (i.e., Arkansas), and one without the 
shale formations necessary for fracking operations to occur (i.e., Oregon). While there may be 
some state-based differences regarding fracking benefit-risk perceptions and levels of trust in 
various institutions (see Appendices 2 and 3), the current research focused on the means by 
which individuals derive their perceptions of fracking benefits and risks, as opposed to the levels 
of benefits and risks perceived by individuals. Thus, the differences in fracking-related attitudes 
is of relatively minor concern, as compared to the process by which these attitudes are 
developed. The authors know of no empirical or theoretical justification for the decision-making 
process to be distinct across different contexts, particularly as examined here. However, future 
research examining both other states with different contexts surrounding fracking and 
nationwide would be beneficial in order to validate the current results. Third, we did not account 
for the accuracy or quality of information in our study. As discussed, with much of the 
information regarding fracking being contested and understudied due to a lack of data, 
objectively assessing the quality and/or accuracy of information would be difficult, at best, 
especially for those who are relatively uninformed on the issue. However, future research 
attempting to examine the accuracy and quality of information and its effect on attitudes related 
to fracking operations would be beneficial. Overall, while there are limitations to the current 
study, it represents an early effort at understanding not just whether cultural value 
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predispositions and trust influence benefit-risk perceptions, but the process by which these 
effects occur.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table I. Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic 
Arkansas/Oregon 
Policy Elites 
Arkansas/Oregon 
General Public 
U.S. General Public* 
Median annual 
household income 
$70,000 – $100,000 $40,000 – $50,000 $50,000 – $60,000 
Education level 
(% Bachelor’s 
degree  
or higher) 
74% 45% 30% 
Race 92% White 84% White 62% White 
Gender 65% Male 48% Male 49% Male 
*Source: United States Census Bureau QuickFacts (https://www.census.gov/quickfacts) 
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Table II. Dependent Variable and Measures 
 
Variable Measure 
Perceived 
Benefit-Risk 
associated 
with Fracking 
Operations  
How much benefit do you think fracking operations would bring to your community in 
the form of a stable and reliable energy supply? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= 
Extremely beneficial)* 
How much benefit do you think fracking operations would bring to your community in 
the form of energy independence? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely 
beneficial)* 
How much benefit do you think fracking operations would bring to your community in 
the form of new economic opportunities (e.g. job creation)? (0=Not at all beneficial to 
10= Extremely beneficial)* 
How much benefit do you think fracking operations would bring to your community in 
the form of an increase in local tax revenue and improvement for public services? 
(0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely beneficial)* 
How much benefit do you think fracking operations would bring to your community in 
the form of a reduction in air pollution and water use compared with other fossil fuels 
(e.g. coal)? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely beneficial)* 
How much risk do you think fracking operations would pose to your community in the 
form of air pollution brought about by the fracking process? (0=No risk to 10= Extreme 
risk) 
How much risk do you think fracking operations would pose to your community in the 
form of overuse of water in your community? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
How much risk do you think fracking operations would pose to your community in the 
form of contamination of ground water by chemicals used in the fracking process? 
(0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
How much risk do you think fracking operations would pose to your community in the 
form of exposure to citizens of toxic chemicals? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
How much risk do you think fracking operations would pose to your community in the 
form of earthquakes caused by fracking processes? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk) 
How much risk do you think fracking operations would pose to your community in the 
form of disposal of “fracking waste” in your community? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme 
risk) 
Fracking 
benefit-risk 
index** 
Index of above eleven items for elites (α=0.92) and the general public (α=0.90) 
      * Reverse-coded 
      ** Higher score indicates higher risk and lower benefits perceived. 
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Table III. Primary Independent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
 
Egalitarianism 
 
Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more 
equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Egalitarianism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.78; Public α=0.79) 
 
Individualism 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world.(1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people 
succeed or fail on their own. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Individualism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.73; Public α=0.70) 
 
Hierarchism 
Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. (1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do to the best of your 
abilities. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those 
who break the rules. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Hierarchism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.60; Public α=0.67) 
 
Fatalism 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces 
beyond our control. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Fatalism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.68; Public α=0.76) 
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Table IV. Mediator Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Trust in energy industry 
How much would you trust the energy industry for providing 
reliable information about fracking processes and operations?  
(0=No trust whatsoever to 10=Completely trust) 
Trust in environmental 
groups 
How much would you trust environmental groups for providing 
reliable information about fracking processes and operations? 
(0=No trust whatsoever to 10=Completely trust) 
Trust in government 
How much would you trust government agencies for providing 
reliable information about fracking processes and operations?  
(0=No trust whatsoever to 10=Completely trust) 
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Table V. Control Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Level of knowledge of 
energy issues 
Most scientists and energy experts agree that the estimates for natural gas reserves in 
the U.S. have increased since 2001. (0=False; 1=Trueab) 
Coal-fired electric power plants in Arkansas (Oregon) supply almost three quarters of the 
state’s electricity. (0=False; 1=Trueab) 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 clearly states that the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) holds comprehensive federal regulatory authorities on fracking practices. 
(0=Falseab; 1=True) 
Currently, there is no government-declared moratorium placed on new injection wells 
(for natural gas drilling) in Arkansas (Oregon). (0=Falsea; 1=Trueb) 
Currently, the majority of all U.S. natural gas production is attributed to shale gas from 
fracking operations. (0=Falseab; 1=True) 
Due to energy security concerns, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) currently 
enforces an absolute ban on natural gas export. (0=Falseab; 1=True) 
The first commercially successful fracking operation in the United States to place several 
decades ago. (0=False; 1=Trueab) 
Knowledge index Index of above seven items (i.e., number of correct answers) 
 
Race 1=Non-Hispanic White 
Gender 1=Male 
Age Age in years 
Education 
Level of education (1=Elementary through some high school to 7=Doctorate (of any 
type)) 
Income Total estimated annual household income (1=less than $20,000 to 9=$300,000 or more) 
State 0=Oregon; 1=Arkansas 
Note: a = Correct answer for Arkansas Sample; b = Correct answer for Oregon Sample 
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Table VI. Mediation Analysis Results Based On Methods Suggested By Preacher and Hayes (General Public) 
X M Y c (X→Y) a (X→M) SE(a) b (M→Y) SE(b) ab SE(ab) 
Egalitarianism 
Trust in 
energy 
industry 
Fracking 
benefit-risk 
perceptions 
0.378* -0.193* 0.083 -0.264* 0.024 0.051* 0.024 
Individualism -0.277* 0.549* 0.083 -0.264* 0.024 -0.145* 0.028 
Hierarchism -0.229* 0.552* 0.084 -0.264* 0.024 -0.146* 0.028 
Fatalism 0.131* 0.190* 0.083 -0.264* 0.024 -0.050* 0.024 
Egalitarianism 
Trust in 
environmental  
groups 
0.378* 1.190* 0.078 0.252* 0.025 0.299* 0.038 
Individualism -0.277* -0.314* 0.078 0.252* 0.025 -0.079* 0.023 
Hierarchism -0.229* 0.020 0.080 0.252* 0.025 0.005 0.020 
Fatalism 0.131* 0.261* 0.078 0.252* 0.025 0.066* 0.022 
Egalitarianism 
Trust in 
government 
0.378* 0.553* 0.085 -0.028 0.024 -0.015 0.013 
Individualism -0.277* -0.243* 0.085 -0.028 0.024 0.007 0.034 
Hierarchism -0.229* 0.089 0.087 -0.028 0.024 -0.002 0.031 
Fatalism 0.131* 0.258* 0.085 -0.028 0.024 -0.007 0.007 
Note: *p<0.05; In the first row of this table, X, M, and Y denote the primary independent variable, the mediator variable, and the 
dependent variable, respectively. The arrow represents a causal relationship between two variables. For instance, X→Y means X 
causes Y. Small characters c, a, and b represent standardized regression coefficients for the causal relationships presented in the 
adjacent parenthesis. More specifically, c (X→Y), a (X→M), and b (M→Y) can be interpreted as the effect of X on Y, the effect of X 
on M, and the effect of M on Y, respectively. SE denotes the standard error of the coefficient estimation. For instance, SE(a) means 
standard error of a. The indirect effect of X on Y (mediated by M), ab, is calculated by a*b, and its standard error, SE(ab), is 
calculated based upon the methods suggested by Preacher and Hayes (Hayes 2013; Preacher and Hayes 2004).  
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Table VII. Mediation Analysis Results Based On Methods Suggested By Preacher and Hayes (Local Policy Elites) 
 
X M Y c (X→Y) a (X→M) SE(a) b (M→Y) SE(b) ab SE(ab) 
Egalitarianism 
Trust in 
energy 
industry 
Fracking 
benefit-risk 
perceptions 
0.463* -0.677* 0.133 -0.247* 0.049 0.167* 0.047 
Individualism -0.337* 0.617* 0.136 -0.247* 0.049 -0.153* 0.050 
Hierarchism 0.006 0.445* 0.137 -0.247* 0.049 -0.110* 0.042 
Fatalism 0.027 -0.329* 0.140 -0.247* 0.049 0.082* 0.040 
Egalitarianism 
Trust in 
environmental  
groups 
0.463* 1.184* 0.130 0.336* 0.050 0.398* 0.089 
Individualism -0.337* -1.152* 0.133 0.336* 0.050 -0.387* 0.080 
Hierarchism 0.006 -0.356* 0.133 0.336* 0.050 -0.120* 0.051 
Fatalism 0.027 0.314* 0.136 0.336* 0.050 0.106* 0.050 
Egalitarianism 
Trust in 
government 
0.463* 0.541* 0.133 -0.030 0.051 -0.016 0.030 
Individualism -0.337* -0.768* 0.136 -0.030 0.051 0.023 0.043 
Hierarchism 0.006 0.216 0.136 -0.030 0.051 -0.006 0.015 
Fatalism 0.027 0.069 0.139 -0.030 0.051 -0.002 0.059 
Note: *p<0.05; In the first row of this table, X, M, and Y denote the primary independent variable, the mediator variable, and the 
dependent variable, respectively. The arrow represents a causal relationship between two variables. For instance, X→Y means X 
causes Y. Small characters c, a, and b represent standardized regression coefficients for the causal relationships presented in the 
adjacent parenthesis. More specifically, c (X→Y), a (X→M), and b (M→Y) can be interpreted as the effect of X on Y, the effect of X 
on M, and the effect of M on Y, respectively. SE denotes the standard error of the coefficient estimation. For instance, SE(a) means 
standard error of a. The indirect effect of X on Y (mediated by M), ab, is calculated by a*b, and its standard error, SE(ab), is 
calculated based upon the methods suggested by Preacher and Hayes (Hayes 2013; Preacher and Hayes 2004).  
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Table VIII. Comparing Mediation Effects Between Local Policy Elites and the General Public 
 Note: Only significant mediation effects shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Independent 
Variable 
Mediator Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Local Policy 
Elites 
95%  
Confidence Interval 
General 
Public 
95%  
Confidence Interval  
Egalitarianism 
Trust in energy Industry 
Fracking 
benefit-risk 
perceptions 
0.17 [0.088, 0.278] 0.05 [0.004, 0.10] 
Trust in environmental groups 0.40 [0.252, 0.587] 0.30 [0.231, 0.380] 
Individualism 
Trust in energy Industry -0.15 [-0.270, -0.072] -0.15 [-0.204, -0.097] 
Trust in environmental groups -0.39 [-0.561, -0.250] -0.08 [-0.129, -0.038] 
Hierarchism 
Trust in energy Industry -0.11 [-0.210, -0.042] -0.15 [-0.208, -0.099] 
Trust in environmental groups -0.12 [-0.230, -0.028] -- [-0.035, 0.043] 
Fatalism 
Trust in energy Industry 0.08 [0.018, 0.172] -0.05 [-0.100, -0.003] 
Trust in environmental groups 0.11 [0.015, 0.210] 0.07 [0.026, 0.112] 
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Figure 1: Outline of Hypothesized Relationships between Cultural Values, Trust in Information Sources, and Fracking 
Benefit-Risk Perceptions 
 
Cultural Values: 
-Egalitarianism 
-Individualism 
-Hierarchism 
-Fatalism 
Trust in Information 
Sources: 
-Energy Industry 
-Environmental Groups 
-Government Agencies 
Fracking Benefit-Risk 
Perceptions 
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Figure 2. Cultural Values, Trust, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions for the General Public 
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Note: Only significant paths are shown. Trust in Government was excluded from this figure for clarity as there was no significant 
mediation associated with it. All paths are statistically significant at the level of p < 0.05. Solid lines represent positive relations while 
dashed lines visualize negative associations. Coefficients shown are standardized regression coefficients. Control variables (e.g., 
knowledge level and demographic characteristics) are not reported, but were included in the regression analysis.  
(a) Full Model:   Adj. R
2
=0.400; DOF=909 
(b) Trust Energy: Adj. R
2
=0.142; DOF=912 
(c) Trust Environment:  Adj. R
2
=0.251; DOF=912 
 
 
+0
.1
9 
−0.277 
−0.229 
+0.1
31 
5
3
 
54 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cultural Values, Trust, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions for Local Policy Elites 
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(a) Full Model:   Adj. R
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(c) Trust Environment:  Adj. R
2
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Note: Only significant paths are shown. Trust in Government was excluded from this figure for clarity as there was no significant 
mediation associated with it. All paths are statistically significant at the level of p < 0.05. Solid lines represent positive relations while 
dashed lines visualize negative associations. Coefficients shown are standardized regression coefficients. Control variables (e.g., 
knowledge level and demographic characteristics) are not reported, but were included in the regression analysis.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics for Local Policy Elites and the General Public 
 
 
(a) Local Policy Elites 
Statistic N Mean  S.D. Min Max 
Age 561 53.75 12.79  22    89 
Education 391 4.60  1.40   2     7 
Income 404 5.61  2.06   1    11 
Knowledge 480 0.50  0.25 0.000 1.000 
Egalitarianism 384 -0.010 0.981 -2.169 2.527 
Individualism 384 -0.015 0.996 -2.553 2.824 
Hierarchism 384 0.017 0.986 -2.259 3.145 
Fatalism 384 0.002 0.977 -1.655 3.833 
 
(b) General Public 
Statistic N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Age 1,145 49.04 16.89 18 88 
Education 1,139 3.57 1.32 1 7 
Income 1,145 3.27 1.71 1 9 
Knowledge 1,126 0.45 0.24 0.000 1.000 
Egalitarianism 1,052 -0.016 1.001 -2.668 2.212 
Individualism 1,052 0.014 0.997 -3.004 2.684 
Hierarchism 1,052 -0.004 0.995 -2.726 2.474 
Fatalism 1,052 -0.016 0.994 -2.350 2.599 
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Appendix 2. OLS Regression Results for Local Policy Elites 
 Dependent variable:  
 Trust in 
Government 
Trust in  
Environmental Groups 
Trust in  
Energy Industry 
Fracking Benefit-Risk 
Perceptions 
Egalitarianism 0.592*** 1.053*** -0.644*** 0.436*** 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.124) (0.125) 
Individualism -0.781*** -1.051*** 0.609*** -0.284** 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) 
Hierarchism 0.183 -0.332*** 0.511*** -0.018 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.111) 
Fatalism 0.187 0.365*** -0.169 0.067 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.123) (0.110) 
Age -0.015 -0.017* -0.013 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Education 0.221** 0.032 0.070 -0.162** 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.079) 
Income 0.040 0.080 -0.005 0.014 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.062) 
Race (White) 0.293 0.437 -0.246 -0.488 
 (0.430) (0.429) (0.430) (0.353) 
Gender (Male) 0.367 -0.356 -0.251 -0.707*** 
 (0.274) (0.275) (0.273) (0.235) 
State (Arkansas) 0.337 0.517* 0.053 -0.008 
 (0.277) (0.279) (0.278) (0.225) 
Knowledge 0.149 0.421 0.107 -0.459 
 (0.542) (0.548) (0.542) (0.478) 
Trust in Government    0.002 
    (0.050) 
Trust in Environmental Groups    0.311*** 
    (0.049) 
Trust in Energy Industry    -0.248*** 
    (0.048) 
(Intercept) 2.967*** 3.783*** 4.125*** 7.524*** 
 (0.770) (0.780) (0.773) (0.711) 
Observations 348 349 347 283 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.337 0.141 0.478 
F Statistic 8.058*** 17.055*** 6.178*** 19.434*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix 3. OLS Regression Results for the General Public 
 Dependent variable:  
 Trust in  
Government 
Trust in  
Environmental Groups 
Trust in  
Energy 
Industry 
Fracking Benefit-Risk 
Perceptions 
Egalitarianism 0.545*** 1.187*** -0.162** 0.378*** 
 (0.080) (0.075) (0.078) (0.061) 
Individualism -0.244*** -0.297*** 0.560*** -0.277*** 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.078) (0.056) 
Hierarchism 0.137* -0.028 0.544*** -0.229*** 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.078) (0.056) 
Fatalism 0.221*** 0.238*** 0.186** 0.131** 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.078) (0.054) 
Age -0.007 -0.007 -0.013*** 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Education 0.226*** 0.036 -0.087 -0.069 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.064) (0.045) 
Income 0.207*** 0.218*** 0.103** 0.028 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.035) 
Race (White) -0.443** -0.225 -0.344 -0.058 
 (0.222) (0.207) (0.215) (0.148) 
Gender (Male) 0.194 -0.508*** -0.085 -0.553*** 
 (0.162) (0.151) (0.157) (0.109) 
State (Arkansas) 0.011 0.732*** 0.830*** -0.541*** 
 (0.185) (0.172) (0.179) (0.123) 
Knowledge -0.190 -0.132 -0.956** 0.423 
 (0.393) (0.367) (0.381) (0.269) 
Trust Government    -0.028 
    (0.024) 
Trust Environmental 
Groups 
   0.252*** 
    (0.025) 
     
Trust Energy Industry    -0.264*** 
    (0.024) 
(Intercept) 3.172*** 4.745*** 5.400*** 6.263*** 
 (0.395) (0.367) (0.382) (0.308) 
Observations 1,028 1,026 1,027 924 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.242 0.131 0.391 
F Statistic 10.200*** 30.679*** 15.122*** 43.258*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Cultural Values, Perceived Value Congruence, and Trust: Examining the Origins of Trust 
in Information Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing among Local Policy Elites in 
Arkansas and Oregon 
 
Abstract: Trust is an important component of information-seeking, particularly as related to the 
policy-making process. For policy-relevant information to be utilized by decision-makers and, in 
turn, impact policy, the source of the information must be viewed as trustworthy. Thus, 
understanding the origins of trust in sources of information regarding a particular policy issue is 
necessary in understanding the policy process associated with that issue. In this paper, I 
examine the origins of trust in information regarding hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) – a highly 
controversial method of oil and gas extraction. Specifically, this paper examines the role of 
cultural value predispositions in shaping trust in information from various sources (e.g. the 
energy industry, environmental groups, scientists, and the government) regarding fracking. 
Further, the moderating role of perceived value congruence is examined. This study utilizes a 
survey of local policy elites in Arkansas (a state with fracking operations) and Oregon (a state 
without fracking operations). Findings indicate that, for local policy elites 1) trust in sources of 
information is largely derived from culturally held values, 2) the perceived compatibility of values 
between local policy elites’ and those within their community impacts these relationships, and 3) 
the triadic relationships between cultural values, perceived value congruence, and trust in 
information sources are distinct between contexts (i.e. Arkansas and Oregon). Implications for 
the policy process, both practical and theoretical, are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Trust in information plays an important role in the development of attitudes such as benefit-risk 
perceptions and, ultimately, policy preferences. Trust in authorities, for example, has been 
found to shape perceptions in a broad range of risk domains (Barnes 2002; Heitz et al. 2009; 
Njome et al. 2010; Terpstra 2010; Viklund 2003). Thus, the origins of (dis)trust in information 
from a given source are particularly relevant in understanding policy-making, particularly the 
decision-making process of local policy elites – conceptualized here to be those who have the 
political capital capable of being utilized to impact the policy process at various stages (Moyer 
and Song 2016; Skrentny 2006; Tumlison et al. 2018; Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2017; 
Tumlison and Song 2019) – as these are the individuals who have at least the potential to 
directly and explicitly shape public policies, particularly as compared to the general public.  
In examining the origins of trust, several conceptualizations of trust have been offered. 
Importantly, it is argued that trust can decrease the cognitive load in decision-making by 
allowing individuals to utilize information from others who are deemed to have accurate views 
by the trustor (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000; Wachinger et al. 2013). Some take a cognitive 
approach to the origins of trust, wherein it is viewed that trust is derived from an individual 
actively considering both the benefits and risks of relying on the action of the trustee while 
having no control over those actions (e.g. Luhmann 2000). Alternatively, others take a more 
social view of trust, arguing that trust stems from perceiving values to be similar between the 
trustor and trustee (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000). This study assumes a similar 
approach to trust, with cultural value predispositions being utilized as a framework from which 
an individual’s trust in information from a given source is derived. This approach is similar to that 
of motivated reasoning, wherein individuals actively choose sources of information that they 
believe to be in congruence with their own beliefs (Jones and Song 2014; Kunda 1990; Lodge 
and Taber 2007; Taber and Lodge 2006). This process of motivated reasoning leads to 
confirmation bias, wherein information that is congruent with prior held beliefs is given more 
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credit, and disconfirmation bias, wherein incongruent information is discredited or discarded 
(Taber and Lodge 2006). 
 To examine the origins of trust in information, this study focuses on the issue of 
hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as “fracking.” Fracking is a relatively recently utilized 
method of oil and gas extraction involving drilling a layer of rock and injecting a mixture 
consisting of sand, water, and other chemicals which enables the flow of oil and gas (Boudet et 
al. 2014; Kester, Moyer, and Song 2015; Pye 1973). The increasing usage of this gas and oil 
extraction method has been met with a significant amount of controversy, largely based on 
arguments over the benefits versus risks associated with the method. Supporters argue that 
fracking is a beneficial process because it will, it is argued, lead to increased economic growth 
and a more stable and secure energy supply (Boudet et al. 2014; Considine, Watson, and 
Blumsack 2010; Hultman et al. 2011). Those opposed to fracking argue that the fracking 
process poses excessive risks to clean local water supplies and community-level infrastructures 
(Boudet et al. 2014; J. Jacquet 2009; Kargbo, Wilhelm, and Campbell 2010).  
 With fracking being increasingly utilized and a relatively new method of oil and gas 
extraction, the impacts of fracking – both in terms of benefits and risks – are to a large extent 
unknown. This makes fracking an issue where trust in information is particularly important, as 
fracking-oriented policy preferences are developed based on limited but evolving levels 
information. As such, this paper examines the origins of trust in fracking-related information from 
four different sources – the energy industry, environmental groups, the government, and 
scientists. Specifically, I examine (1) the role of cultural value predispositions in shaping trust in 
information sources, (2) how perceived value congruence levels impact these relationships, and 
(3) whether these relationships are the same in two different states – Arkansas, a state with 
fracking operations, and Oregon, a state which lacks the shale formations necessary for 
fracking to occur.  I begin by first discussing grid-group cultural theory general, as well as how 
cultural value predispositions, perceived value congruence, and context (i.e. Arkansas vs 
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Oregon) may shape levels of trust in a given source of information. I next offer and test a set of 
hypotheses related to the role of cultural value predispositions in shaping trust in information 
provided by various sources (i.e. the energy industry, environmental groups, and the 
government), and end with a discussion of the implications for both theory and practice. 
 
Theories and Hypotheses 
Grid-Group Cultural Theory 
In examining the value-based origins of trust in information sources, grid-group cultural theory is 
utilized. Cultural Theory (CT) (Ripberger et al. 2012; Swedlow 2011; Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990) originated as a theory focusing on risk perception and argues that risk 
perceptions are at least partially developed in an effort to protect one’s “way of life” or cultural 
worldview  (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Johnson and Swedlow 2019; Swedlow 2017). 
Perceptions of risk are, therefore, driven by an effort to protect an individual’s preferred value-
based preferences, or way of life. Actions or issues that would violate the cultural worldviews 
held by an individual would therefore be likely to be considered as having higher levels of 
perceived risk, whereas actions or issues that are in line with an individual’s value preferences 
are more likely to be evaluated as less risky and more beneficial. In this way, risks are argued 
not to be shaped exclusively by the technical components of the debate, but also by how the 
individual views the ideal way in which society should be organized and function (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982; Johnson and Swedlow 2019; Kahan et al. 2007). In terms of predicting risk 
perceptions, CT has indeed been found to be just as, if not more, robust of a predictor as 
compared to other theoretical perspectives such as personality, knowledge, and economically or 
politically based views, supporting the notion that perceptions of risk are, to some degree, 
socially constructed (Johnson and Swedlow 2019; Wildavsky and Dake 1990). 
 Cultural Theory argues that social relations are a mechanism by which cultural biases 
are shared, which, in turn, shapes individual-level behavior in a multitude of ways. Two 
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dimensions are used to develop a typology that consists of four primary cultural worldviews – 
egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism (Johnson and Swedlow 2019; 
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2017). The first dimension – 
“grid” – is focused on the constraints that role differentiation within society shapes an 
individual’s behavior. The second dimension – “group” – is focused on the degree to which 
individuals view themselves as bound to their social group (Ney and Verweij 2014; Thompson, 
Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Each of the four resulting cultural value predispositions is 
contradistinct from the others, and together they operate as a system. The distinction between 
the worldviews helps to develop perceptions of risks that are similar to those of others who 
share cultural value predispositions and are distinct from those who hold dissimilar worldviews. 
Additionally, these distinct worldviews reinforce the ideological proclivities of individuals within 
their cultural group while creating opposition with other cultural value groups via values-based 
distinctions. The resulting interactions between the four cultural groups create unique 
perspectives and attitudes, particularly in perceptions of nature and economic systems 
(Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
 Egalitarians (low grid-high group) lack role differentiation and have strong bonds to their 
social group. Egalitarians tend to distrust authority which reinforces group cohesion, with equity 
and fairness being highly valued. Nature is viewed as fragile and easily damaged by 
egalitarians, who prefer to manage and protect nature, making actions that are perceived to put 
nature at risk untenable (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, 
and Wildavsky 1990). Individualists (low grid-low group) tend to prefer a more libertarian society 
in which risk equates to opportunity (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Individualists tend 
to prefer a society in which individuals succeed or fail based on the results of competition, 
regardless of socioeconomic status or other potential advantages or disadvantages that an 
individual might have (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Nature is viewed as resilient and 
robust by individualists who are accepting of experimentation with nature, which allows for the 
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“best possible” outcomes (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, 
Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Hierarchs (high grid-high group) view maintaining order as 
important, with social and institutional rules being important components in maintaining order. 
Hierarchs tend to view decisions regarding the directions of society to be best made by experts. 
Similar to individualists, hierarchs view wealth creation as a priority. However, unlike 
individualists, hierarchs believe that a key means by which success can be achieved is 
obedience to authority. As with individualists, hierarchs view nature as robust but, unlike 
individualists, are accepting of regulations in an effort to prevent disrupting equilibrium (Dake 
1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Fatalists 
(high grid-low group) view outcomes as determined largely by fate, making them skeptical of the 
ability to control or prevent undesired situations (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 
2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
 While CT has not been often utilized in the examination of trust formation, the preceding 
discussions of both trust formation and Cultural Theory indicate that cultural value 
predispositions likely influence trust formation, as cultural value predispositions represent a 
means by which shared values between the trustor (i.e. local policy elite) and trustee (i.e. 
source of information) can be shared, as certain sources of information may be seen to align 
with an individual’s worldview, whereas other sources may be seen as in conflict with an 
individual’s worldview. Indeed, cultural value predispositions have been found to predict trust in 
sources of information in the context of High Voltage Powerlines (Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 
2017) and Hydraulic Fracturing (Tumlison and Song 2019). 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Perceived Value Congruence 
Perceived value congruence – the degree to which an individual views their own values as 
compatible with the values within their community – has received little attention in the decision-
making literature, particularly as related to the policy-making process. However, the concept of 
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homophily, which has largely been examined in terms of social networks and communication, 
can provide some insights into the role that perceived value congruence may play in shaping 
trust in sources of information. Broadly, homophily is the “tendency of people with similar traits 
(including physical, cultural, and attitudinal characteristics) to interact with one another more 
than with people with dissimilar traits.” (Centola et al. 2007, p. 905). There have been multiple 
types of homophily conceptualized in the literature. Two broad conceptualizations are that of 
choice homophily and induced homophily, both of which are relevant to the current study. 
Choice homophily (Centola et al. 2007; J. M. McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; M. McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) represents situations in which the desire for similarity drives 
interactions. From a psychological perspective, when we are surrounded by those with beliefs 
similar to our own we feel more justified in our opinions (Huston and Levinger 1978; Knoke 
1994; Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954). Similarly, interacting with those whose cultural background 
is similar increases feelings of comfort associated with the interaction (Fischer Claude 1977; 
Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; Marsden 1987, 1988; Shrum, Cheek Jr, and MacD 1988). As 
opposed to choice homophily where homophily occurs due to proactive actions taken by an 
individual, induced homophily is derived from dynamics of influence that, over time, make 
individuals more similar (Centola et al. 2007; J. M. McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; M. 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). This “induced homophily” has also been referred to 
as social influence (Centola et al. 2007). 
 Both choice homophily and induced homophily (i.e. social influence) can impact the 
sorting of individuals into groups with shared values. As individuals sort themselves into like-
minded groups (choice homophily) differences between individuals likely reduce. However, 
when there is significant population heterogeneity (in terms of values, in the current case), the 
similarity that exists among homophilous groups can increase the dissimilarity between 
members of one group and those of another (Centola et al. 2007; Duncan, Haller, and Portes 
1968; Knoke 1994).  
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The conceptualization of perceived value congruence here does not distinguish between 
choice and induced homophily. However, the impacts of each are relevant to the 
conceptualization. When perceived value congruence is low (i.e. when an individual views their 
values and the values of their community to be dissimilar/incompatible) the opportunity to 
participate in homophilous relationships may be limited, applying pressure via social influence 
on the attitudes and preferences of an individual. Alternatively, when perceived value 
congruence is high (i.e. when an individual views their values and the values of their community 
to be similar/compatible) the opportunity to affirm one’s views is likely increased. Thus, I argue 
here that the relationship between an individual’s own cultural value predispositions and trust in 
information from various sources is conditioned on that individual’s views of the congruence 
between their own values and the values of their community.  
Arkansas versus Oregon 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) places particular emphasis on policy subsystems, 
which are defined by the actors who influence subsystem affairs, the policy topic, and territorial 
scope (H. C. Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Further, a given policy subsystem is nested within 
larger policy subsystems (H. C. Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). For 
example, in the current case, the policy subsystems associated with fracking in Arkansas and 
Oregon are to some extent distinct from each other, while also both being nested within the 
United States energy policy subsystem.  
 In addition to being nested within other subsystems, policy subsystems also exist in the 
context of broader systems, such as the overall political system, which can exert influence on a 
given policy subsystem. More specifically, the ACF argues that factors outside of the policy 
subsystem impact subsystem dynamics and activities. Relatively stable parameters, such as the 
constitutional structure and social structure, as well as external subsystem events, such as 
changes in public opinion, socioeconomic conditions, or changes in other policy subsystems 
can indirectly influence a given policy subsystem via long-term coalition opportunity structures 
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and the short-term constraints and resources of subsystem actors (H. C. Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014; Pierce et al. 2017). 
 Internally, a given policy subsystem consists of at least two coalitions, each having a 
shared set of beliefs and resources which shape the strategies utilized, which in turn influences 
governmental decisions, policy outputs and, ultimately, policy impacts (H. C. Jenkins-Smith et 
al. 2014; Pierce et al. 2017). Together, then, policy subsystems are impacted externally – by the 
broader systems and subsystems that the focal policy subsystem is nested in, by changes to 
components of those (sub)systems, and events and outputs experienced in other policy 
subsystems – as well as by the internal dynamics of the policy subsystem itself.  
The subsystems between the two states are distinct in terms of both geography and 
politics. Arkansas is a state with current fracking operations, whereas Oregon lacks the shale 
formations necessary for viable fracking operations (EIA 2016). Further, the political 
environment in the two states is distinct, with Arkansas representing a relatively conservative 
state and Oregon a relatively liberal state. This distinction between the political environments 
can be seen in the delegations of each state to the federal government with, at the time this 
research was conducted, the Arkansas delegation to Congress being six Republican 
representatives and the Oregon delegation to Congress being one Republican and seven 
Democrats (Congress Profiles | US House of Representatives n.d.).  
Based on the above discussion, comparing the decision-making processes of local 
policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon provides the opportunity to examine how decision-making 
regarding the same policy issue may differ between two policy subsystems which are nested in 
(largely) the same overall set of systems and policy-relevant subsystems (e.g. the national 
energy policy subsystem). Specifically, I argue that due to the differences between the policy 
subsystems that local policy elites operate in, the way in which both a local policy elites’ cultural 
value predispositions and perceived value congruence operate together to shape trust in a 
given source of information may be distinct. 
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Hypotheses 
The focus of this study has three primary considerations. First is examining the role that cultural 
value predispositions play in shaping trust in information sources related to fracking. Second is 
examining how the perceived congruence between an individual’s own values and those of the 
community in which they are situated impacts the relationship(s) between cultural value 
predispositions and trust. Third is examining whether the aforementioned patterns of 
relationships operate consistently between two contexts, specifically in two different states – 
Arkansas and Oregon. Cultural value predispositions have been shown to impact the trust levels 
of local policy elites in the context of High Voltage Power Lines (Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 
2017) and hydraulic fracturing (Tumlison and Song 2019), with egalitarianism and individualism 
being the most consistently related to trust, such that egalitarians tend to trust information 
provided by environmental groups and distrust information provided by the energy industry, 
whereas individualists tend to trust information provided by the energy industry and distrust 
information provided by environmental groups – suggesting that trust in various sources of 
information is indeed derived, at least to some extent, by a perceived congruence between the 
values of the trustee and the trustor. As such, the current focus is on investigating the 
moderating role of perceived value congruence on the relationship between cultural value 
predispositions and trust in information sources as well as the comparison of these relationships 
between local policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon. Therefore, three hypotheses are offered 
(see Figure 2 for a visual representation of hypotheses). First (H1), cultural value 
predispositions will be related to trust in information from each source, with sources of 
information that represent congruent values with a given cultural value predisposition 
demonstrating a positive relationship (i.e. increased trust) and sources of information that 
represent incongruent values with a given cultural value predisposition demonstrating a 
negative relationship (i.e. decreased trust). Specifically, I expect egalitarianism to be positively 
related to trust in information from environmental groups and the government, and negatively 
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related to trust in information from the energy industry. Alternatively, I expect individualism to be 
positively related to trust in information from the energy industry, and negatively related to trust 
in information from environmental groups and the government. For hierarchism, I expect a 
positive relationship with trust in information from the energy industry and the government, and 
a negative relationship with trust in information from environmental groups. For fatalism, no 
particular expectations are offered, as fatalists are expected not to participate in the policy 
process, seeing outcomes as determined by chance. Second (H2), the aforementioned 
relationships between cultural value predispositions and trust in information from various 
sources (i.e. the energy industry, environmental groups, and the government) will be 
conditioned on levels of perceived value congruence. Third (H3), the pattern of relationships will 
be distinct between the two contexts – Arkansas and Oregon.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
Data, Variables, and Measures 
Survey Data 
To examine the relationships between cultural value predispositions, perceived value 
congruence, and trust in information I utilize data from a survey distributed to local policy elites 
in Arkansas and Oregon between December 2015 and January 2016, and again between 
December 2016 and January 2017. A total of 1,110 responses were received, with the majority 
(825) from Oregon and similar numbers for each time period (585 from 2015-2016 and 525 from 
2016-2017). Local policy elites were defined as those individuals who hold both political 
resources and the capability to have influence in the policy process at the local level (Moyer and 
Song 2015; Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2017; Tumlison and Song 2019). Specifically, those 
likely to be associated with the policy process around energy policy issues were of primary 
focus. 
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Dependent Variables and Measures 
The dependent variables in these analyses were trust in four different sources of information 
regarding fracking – the energy industry, environmental groups, and the government. These 
three potential sources of information were chosen as each are likely to play an important role in 
the policy debate associated with hydraulic fracturing, with the energy industry and 
environmental groups representing competing factions in the debate over fracking policies, and 
the government representing the institution with the capacity to create and implement laws and 
policies associated with fracking. These variables were measured utilizing an eleven-point scale 
measuring the degree to which the respondent trusted each source of information for providing 
reliable information regarding fracking. Higher scores indicate higher levels of perceived 
trustworthiness.10  
Independent Variables, Moderator Variable, and Measures 
The primary independent variables in this analysis are the four cultural value predispositions as 
described by Cultural Theory – egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism. A 
previously validated scale of twelve items was used. Each of the four cultural value 
predispositions were represented by three items (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2014; Jones and 
Song 2014; Ripberger et al. 2014; Song, Silva, and Jenkins-Smith 2014). For each item, 
respondents rated their agreement on a seven-point scale anchored at 1 (=Strongly disagree) 
and 7 (=Strongly agree). A factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the 
responses to these twelve items, with each set of three items loading onto a single factor 
representing the four cultural value predispositions. From here, a factor score for each of the 
four dimensions was calculated for each respondent for use in the following analyses. 
 The moderating variable in these analyses is perceived value congruence. This was 
measured via a single item that asked respondents the degree to which the respondents felt 
 
10 Please see Appendices 1, 2, 3, and 4 for dependent variables and measures, independent variables 
and measures, moderator variable and measure, and control variables and measures, respectively. 
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their own values were compatible with the values in their community, with values ranging from 1 
(=Highly incompatible) to 7 (=Highly compatible). 
Control Variables and Measures 
In addition to the primary variables of interest, control variables were also included in the 
following analyses in order to isolate the effects of the primary variables of interest. These 
included age, education, income, gender, race, the respondent’s state, and the year the survey 
was taken. The average age of respondents was 54 years old. The majority of respondents 
were white (92%) and male (64%). 
 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
To examine the relationships between cultural value predispositions and trust in information 
from various sources, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression was utilized. The analysis was 
conducted, and is presented, in two phases. The first phase utilizes the full sample to examine 
the relationships between each of the four cultural value predispositions and trust. For the 
second set of analyses, the sample was divided into four subsamples – those policy elites who 
viewed themselves as having congruent values with their community in each state, and those 
policy elites who viewed themselves as having incongruent values with their community in each 
state – Arkansas and Oregon11. This was done for each state based on the responses to the 
perceived value compatibility item in the survey, with respondents who answered < 4 classified 
as incompatible and respondents who answered > 4 classified as compatible. Respondents who 
answered 4, the midpoint of the scale, were not included in the subset analyses. The analyses 
are discussed below, beginning with the full sample analysis of the relationship between cultural 
value predispositions and trust in each of the four sources of information (energy industry, 
 
11 Subsample analysis was utilized in order to not only be able to examine moderation effects, but to also 
separately test statistical significance for the relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust 
in information for each subgroup in the following analyses. 
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environmental groups, government, and scientists). The subsample analyses are then 
discussed for each source of information separately.  
Full Sample 
As shown in Table 1, the full sample analysis consisted of three regressions, one for each of the 
three sources of information regarding fracking, and focused on examining hypothesis 1 – that 
cultural value predispositions shape trust in sources of information. This hypothesis received 
strong support, with cultural value predispositions consistently demonstrating positive 
relationships with sources of information with congruent values, and negative relationships with 
sources of information with incongruent values. 
The first model examines trust in information provided by the energy industry. 
Egalitarianism was negatively related to trust in information from the energy industry (β = -
0.594) such that, as egalitarianism scores increase, trust in information from the energy industry 
decreases. Alternatively, individualism was positively related to trust in information from the 
energy industry (β = 0.66) such that, as individualism scores increase, trust in information from 
the energy industry increases as well. Similarly, hierarchism demonstrated a positive 
relationship with trust in information from the energy industry (β = 0.407). Fatalism was not 
significantly related to trust in information provided by the energy industry. Thus, Hypothesis 1 
was supported for each cultural value predisposition in predicting trust in information from the 
energy industry.  
 The second model presented in Table 1 examines trust in information provided by 
environmental groups. All four of the cultural value predisposition variables were statistically 
significant in predicting trust in information from environmental groups. Egalitarianism (β = 
1.084) and fatalism (β = 0.366) were both positively related to trust in information provided by 
environmental groups such that, as egalitarianism or fatalism scores increase, trust in 
information provided by environmental groups increases as well. Alternatively, individualism (β = 
-1.123) and hierarchism (β = -0.303) were negatively associated with trust in information 
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provided by environmental groups. Thus, for trust in information from environmental groups, 
Hypothesis 1 was supported for each cultural value predisposition. 
 The third model presented in Table 1 examines trust in information provided by the 
government. Egalitarianism (β = 0.554) and fatalism (β = 0.234) were positively related to trust 
in information regarding fracking provided by the government such that, as egalitarianism or 
fatalism scores increase, trust in information from the government increases as well. 
Individualism demonstrated a negative relationship with trust in information provided by the 
government (β = -0.780) such that, as individualism scores increase, trust in information from 
the government decreases. Hierarchism was not significantly related to trust in information from 
the government. Thus, for trust in information from the government, Hypothesis 1 was partially 
supported, as egalitarianism and individualism were both associated with trust in information 
from the government as expected. However, hierarchism, counter to expectations, was not 
significantly related to trust in information from the government. 
 (Table 1 about here) 
 The next set of analyses focus on the second and third hypotheses by examining the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in and between the four 
subsamples, described above. 
Trust in Information from the Energy Industry 
In examining the relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in information 
from the energy industry hypotheses two and three were supported, with differences in effects 
of cultural value predispositions on trust occurring between Compatible versus Incompatible 
subsamples within states, as well as differences between Arkansas and Oregon – particularly 
for the egalitarianism and individualism variables. 
For egalitarianism, trust in information from the energy industry was significant for all 
subsamples except the Oregon Incompatible subsample (see Table 2 and Figure 3). The 
estimated effect size increased from -0.574 in the Arkansas Compatible subsample to -1.957 in 
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the Arkansas Incompatible subsample, supporting Hypothesis 2 and indicating that 
egalitarianism has a stronger impact on trust in information from the energy industry for those 
who view their values as incongruent with the values in their community for policy elites in 
Arkansas. Egalitarianism was also significantly related to trust in information from the energy 
industry in the Oregon Compatible subsample (β = -0.507) but not in the Oregon Incompatible 
subsample, again supporting Hypothesis 2 and indicating that egalitarianism scores shape trust 
in information from the energy industry among policy elites in Oregon who view their values as 
congruent with those of their community, but not for those who view their values as incompatible 
with those in their community. 
 For individualism (see Table 2 and Figure 3), trust in information from the energy 
industry was only statistically significant in the Oregon Compatible subsample (β = 0.800). 
However, individualism was approaching significance (p < 0.1) in the Arkansas Compatible (β = 
0.443) and Oregon Incompatible (β = 0.509) subsamples. In both Arkansas and Oregon, the 
estimated effect size was larger for the Compatible samples as compared to the Incompatible 
samples, with each of the Compatible samples exhibiting higher significance levels than their 
respective Incompatible subsamples. Further, while not significant, the estimated effect of 
individualism on trust in information from the energy industry was negative in the Arkansas 
Incompatible subsample, counter to the other three subsamples. All together, this provides 
some support for Hypothesis 2, with individualism being significant for those in Oregon who 
view their values as congruent with those in their community, and the estimated effect being 
positive in the Arkansas Compatible subsample and negative in the Arkansas Incompatible 
subsample (although in neither subsample did individualism demonstrate a statistically 
significant relationship with trust at p < 0.05).   
 For hierarchism (see Table 2 and Figure 3), trust in information from the energy industry 
was only statistically significant for the Oregon Compatible subsample (β = 0.474), indicating 
that the only group of local policy elites for whom hierarchism impacts trust in information from 
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the energy industry are those in Oregon who view their values as congruent with the values held 
in their community, and providing partial support for Hypothesis 2. Importantly, in the full sample 
model (see Table 1) hierarchism was statistically significant (β = 0.407), indicating that the 
statistical significance in the full model was likely largely driven by the Oregon Compatible 
subsample (see Figure 3).  
 For fatalism (see Table 2 and Figure 3), trust in information from the energy industry was 
only significant in the Oregon Compatible subsample (β = -0.286), providing partial support for 
Hypothesis 2 and demonstrating a negative relationship such that, among local policy elites in 
Oregon who view their values as congruent with those in their community, as fatalism scores 
increase, trust in information from the energy industry decreases. Unlike the case of 
hierarchism, above, this significant effect in the Oregon Compatible subsample was not found in 
the full sample (see Figure 3).  
 Overall, Hypothesis 3 was supported in the case of trust in information from the energy 
industry.  As demonstrated in Table 2 and Figure 3, the estimated effect of egalitarianism on 
trust in information from the energy industry was larger in the Arkansas Incompatible sample as 
compared to the Arkansas Compatible sample. However, the Oregon Incompatible sample 
demonstrated a slightly smaller estimated effect than did the Oregon Compatible sample. For 
individualism, both the Arkansas and Oregon Incompatible samples had smaller estimated 
effect sizes than their respective Compatible subsample counterparts. However, neither of the 
two Arkansas subsamples were statistically significant, with the Arkansas Incompatible 
subsample demonstrating a negative estimated effect whereas the estimated effect in all other 
subsamples was positive. Alternatively, in Oregon, the Compatible subsample was statistically 
significant whereas the Incompatible subsample was not. Hierarchism demonstrated virtually 
the same pattern of relationships as individualism when comparing subsamples across the two 
states. Finally, the relationship between fatalism and trust in information from the energy 
industry was not statistically significant in either Arkansas subsample, but was statistically 
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significant in the Oregon Compatible subsample. Together, these distinct patterns of 
relationships between the two states indicate support for Hypothesis 3.  
(Table 2 and Figure 3 about here) 
Trust in Information from Environmental Groups 
In examining the relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in information 
from environmental groups hypotheses two and three were largely supported, with differences 
in effects of cultural value predispositions on trust occurring between Compatible versus 
Incompatible subsamples within states, as well as differences between Arkansas and Oregon. 
However, Egalitarianism operated consistently across subsamples. 
Egalitarianism was positively related to trust in information from environmental groups in 
all subsamples (see Table 3 and Figure 4) such that, as egalitarian scores increase, trust in 
information from environmental groups increases. The estimated effect size was similar in all 
subsamples, with slight increases from the Arkansas Compatible subsample (β = 1.010) to the 
Arkansas Incompatible subsample (β = 1.202) as well as from the Oregon Compatible 
subsample (β = 1.134) to the Oregon Incompatible subsample (β = 1.214). Generally, these 
results provide no support for Hypothesis 2.  
 Individualism was negatively related to trust in information from environmental groups in 
all subsamples (see Table 3 and Figure 4) such that, as individualism scores increase, trust in 
information from environmental groups decreases. For both Arkansas and Oregon, the 
estimated effect of individualism on trust in information from environmental groups was higher in 
the Incompatible subsample, supporting Hypothesis 2 and indicating that individualism is a 
stronger driver of trust in information from environmental groups when local policy elites in both 
Arkansas and Oregon view their values as incongruent, as compared to congruent, with the 
values in their community.  
 Hierarchism was negatively related to trust in information from environmental groups in 
the Arkansas Compatible subsample (β = -0.615) and the Oregon Compatible subsample (β = -
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0.350), indicating that, for local policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon who view their values as 
congruent with those in their community, as hierarchism scores increase, trust in information 
from environmental groups decreases. However, hierarchism was not significantly related to 
trust in information from environmental groups in either the Arkansas or Oregon Incompatible 
subsamples (see Table 3 and Figure 4), again providing support for Hypothesis 2.  
 Fatalism was positively related to trust in information from environmental groups in the 
Arkansas Compatible subsample (β = 0.465) and Oregon Compatible subsample (β = 0.419), 
but not significantly related in the Oregon Incompatible subsample. Fatalism was approaching 
significance (p = 0.055) in the Arkansas Incompatible subsample with a larger estimated effect 
(β = 1.027) as compared to the Arkansas Compatible subsample, providing support for 
Hypothesis 2 for both Arkansas and Oregon. 
 Overall, Hypothesis 3 received mixed support in the case of the relationship between 
cultural value predispositions and trust in information from environmental groups. There was no 
indication of distinct patterns between the two states for egalitarianism. For individualism, the 
relative relationship between the Compatible and Incompatible subsamples in Arkansas and 
Oregon were similar. However, the degree of the relationship was distinct, with individualism 
demonstrating higher estimated effects on trust in information from environmental groups in 
Oregon as compared to Arkansas. Hierarchism again demonstrated similar patterns as 
individualism, but in the opposite direction, with estimated effect sizes decreasing, and 
becoming non-significant, in the Incompatible subsamples for each state, and with hierarchism 
demonstrating smaller estimated effects on trust in information from environmental groups in the 
Oregon subsamples as compared to the Arkansas subsamples.  
(Table 3 and Figure 4 about here) 
Trust in Information from the Government 
In examining the relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in information 
from the government hypotheses two and three were supported, with differences in effects of 
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cultural value predispositions on trust occurring between Compatible versus Incompatible 
subsamples within states, as well as differences between Arkansas and Oregon. These 
distinctions were particularly noticeable for egalitarianism and individualism.  
Egalitarianism was positively related to trust in information from the government in all 
subsamples except the Arkansas Incompatible subsample (see Table 4 and Figure 5) such that, 
as egalitarianism scores increase, trust in information regarding fracking from the government 
increases, supporting Hypothesis 2. The estimated effect of egalitarianism was slightly higher in 
the Oregon Incompatible subsample (β = 0.833) as compared to the Oregon Compatible 
subsample (β = 0.582).  
 Individualism was negatively related to trust in information from the government in all 
subsamples except the Arkansas Incompatible subsample, such that, as individualism scores 
increase, trust in information from the government decreases (see Table 4 and Figure 5). 
However, this effect was approaching significance for the Arkansas Incompatible sample (p = 
0.071). The estimated effect size increased from the Arkansas Compatible subsample (β = -
0.700) to the Arkansas Incompatible subsample (β = -1.234) and from the Oregon Compatible 
subsample (β = -0.720) to the Oregon Incompatible subsample (β = -1.374), indicating that in 
both Arkansas and Oregon the effect of individualism on trust in information from the 
government regarding fracking is greater for local policy elites who consider their values to be 
incongruent with those in their community as compared to elites who view their values as being 
congruent with those in their community, providing some support for Hypothesis 2. 
 For the effect of hierarchism on trust in information from the government, there were no 
subsamples in which hierarchism was significantly related to trust in information from the 
government. 
 Fatalism was positively related to trust in information from the government in the Oregon 
Compatible sample (see Table 4 and Figure 5) such that, as fatalism scores increase, trust in 
information regarding fracking increases, but only for those local policy elites who view their 
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values as congruent with those in their community in Oregon, supporting Hypothesis 2. There is 
no significant relationship between fatalism and trust in information from the government in any 
other subsamples. However, in the full sample model (see Table 1) fatalism is significant, 
indicating that the significant relationship found in the full model is likely largely driven by local 
policy elites in Oregon who view their values as congruent with those of their community (see 
Figure 5). 
 Overall, in the case of trust in information from the government, Hypothesis 3 received 
mixed support. For egalitarianism, the opposite effect occurred when comparing the Compatible 
versus Incompatible subsamples across the two states, with the estimated effect of 
egalitarianism on trust in information from the government being larger for the Arkansas 
Compatible subsample compared to the Arkansas Incompatible subsample, whereas in Oregon 
the estimated effect of egalitarianism on trust in information from the government was larger in 
the Incompatible subsample. For individualism, the pattern of estimated effects is again similar 
between the two states. However, there is a greater distinction in estimated effects between the 
Compatible and Incompatible subsamples for local policy elites in Oregon. Finally, while the only 
statistically significant effect for fatalism on trust in information from the government was found 
in the Oregon Compatible subsample, the pattern of the relationship between the two states 
was distinct. In Arkansas, the Incompatible subsample had a higher (positive) estimated effect 
as compared to the Compatible subsample, whereas in Oregon, the estimated effect moved 
from statistically significant and positive in the Oregon Compatible subsample, to not statistically 
significant and negative in the Oregon Incompatible subsample. 
(Table 4 and Figure 5 about here) 
Conclusion and Discussion 
It has long been accepted that the values held by individuals shape levels of trust such that 
higher levels of trust exist when values are perceived to be aligned. The current study adds 
nuance to this broad finding. As discussed above, the degree to which a local policy elite views 
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their values and the values of their community as congruent impacts the role that values play in 
shaping trust in information sources. As has been established in previous literature, cultural 
value predispositions play an important role in shaping trust. However, this role is inconsistent 
when considering perceived value congruence. Specifically, when there was a negative 
relationship between a cultural value predisposition and trust in a given source of information 
the estimated effect of the cultural value predisposition on trust tended to be greater in the 
Incompatible subsample as compared to the Compatible subsample. Alternatively, when there 
was a positive relationship between a cultural value predisposition and trust in a given source of 
information the estimated effect of the cultural value predisposition on trust tended to be greater 
in the Compatible subsample as compared to the Incompatible subsample. Together, this 
finding indicates that, for those local policy elites who view their values as incongruent with 
those in their community, cultural value predispositions play a stronger role in shaping distrust 
(as opposed to trust) in information, as compared to those local policy elites who view their 
values as congruent with those in their community. Alternatively, for those local policy elites who 
view their values as congruent with the values in their community, cultural value predispositions 
tend to play a stronger role in shaping trust (as opposed to distrust) in a given source of 
information, as compared to those who view their values as incongruent with those in their 
community. Further, the context within which a local policy elite is nested appears to play a role 
in whether cultural value predispositions and perceived value congruence interact to shape trust 
in sources of information. However, this role is inconsistent. For trust in information from the 
energy industry, the patterns of relationships between cultural value predispositions 
demonstrated differences between the two contexts (Arkansas vs Oregon), with the estimated 
effect of egalitarianism on trust in information from the energy industry being larger for the 
Arkansas Incompatible subsample as compared to the Arkansas Compatible subsample, while 
being smaller (and not statistically significant) in the Oregon Incompatible subsample as 
compared to the Oregon Compatible subsample. For individualism and hierarchism, the 
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patterns of relationships between the two states are similar, but different by degree, with the 
only statistically significant relationship between both individualism and hierarchism and trust in 
information from the energy industry being found in the Oregon Compatible subsample. 
However, for the other two sources of information (i.e. environmental groups and the 
government), the patterns of relationships between cultural value predispositions and trust were 
similar across the two states, with some differences in degree being evident, such as the case 
of individualism and trust in information from environmental groups, wherein the estimated effect 
of individualism was larger in the Incompatible subsample for both states, yet the size of this 
effect was noticeably different, with the Oregon Compatible subsample have virtually the same 
estimated effect as the Arkansas Incompatible subsample.  
These findings are important for several reasons. First, the current findings indicate that 
the relationship between values and trust is not monolithic. The effect of values on trust in a 
given source of information is often distinct based on perceived value congruence and the 
context in which an individual is nested. Thus, two individuals holding the same values can have 
very different levels of trust in a given source of information depending on the context in which 
they are situated (in the current case, Arkansas versus Oregon) as well as how they view 
themselves to fit within that context (perceived value congruence). Thus, the relationship 
between values and trust appears to be more nuanced than previously understood. As such, 
more research is needed to examine the various potential ways that the values-trust relationship 
can be strengthened and/or mitigated. Similarly, more research should be conducted examining 
whether perceived value congruence and context impacts the relationships between values and 
other important policy process oriented dependent variables such as policy preferences, 
perceptions of benefits and risks associated with a given policy, and participation in the policy 
process.  
 Second, the current research has potential implications for theories of the policy process 
more broadly, as trust is often considered a key component. For example, the Narrative Policy 
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Framework (NPF) offers two specific conjectures related to the current study. The first relevant 
hypothesis is that a narrative is more likely to be persuasive as trust in the narrator increases, 
while the second is that a narrative is more likely to be persuasive when the values of the 
narrator are perceived to be congruent with the values of the receiver (Jones and McBeth 2010; 
McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014). 
While the current study does not offer a particular narrative, trust in sources of information 
represents, ultimately, trust in the narrative provided by that source. The current findings 
indicate that perceived value congruence does impact levels of trust in a given source of 
information (i.e. levels of trust in sources of information are higher when that source of 
information represents aligned values). However, this relationship is found to be distinct based 
on the extent to which a local policy elite views their values to be congruent with those in their 
community, as well as the specific context (i.e. Arkansas vs. Oregon) the policy elite is nested 
in. Together, the current findings suggest that research within the NPF should examine whether 
there are boundary conditions to each of the aforementioned hypotheses. For example, does 
the perception of value congruence between the individual and the narrative matter more for the 
narrative’s efficacy for some individuals than others (e.g. those who view their values as 
congruent with the values in their community vs those who see their values as incongruent with 
those in their community).  
 The current findings also provide more nuance to understandings of the origins of trust, 
and potentially the role of trust in shaping various outcomes, such as policy preferences. Trust 
is typically examined as an independent variable of importance, while neglecting the origins of 
trust (Johnson and Slovic 1995; Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 2017; Tumlison and Song 2019; 
Viklund 2003). As such, it is implied that trust is derived from specific interactions between the 
trustee and the trustor, or that the origins of trust are not important (Tumlison, Moyer, and Song 
2017; Tumlison and Song 2019). Further, trust is often considered to be relatively fluid, based 
on the context of the specific issue (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth 2000; Tumlison and Song 
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2019). However, the current study indicates that trust in sources of information may be relatively 
stable, being derived from value congruence between the individual and the source of 
information, as opposed to specific interactions between the individual and information source. 
Further, this relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust is not consistent 
across levels of perceived value congruence with community values and the context (i.e. 
Arkansas vs Oregon) the individual is situated in. Thus, the current findings indicate that there is 
a greater need for nuance in studying both the origins of trust, as well as the outcomes 
associated with trust. 
While the current research has found significant and important results, it is not without its 
limitations. The current research looked at a single issue – hydraulic fracturing. It is possible that 
something associated with the issue of fracking is the reason for these results. For example, 
does the relative newness of the fracking debate impact the current findings? Future research 
should, therefore, consider other policy issues and domains, particularly considering both policy 
issues that are relatively nascent as well as those that are more evolved. Similarly, the current 
study compared two states – Arkansas and Oregon. These two states differ on several factors, 
including geographic location, fracking operations, and political climate. How similar or distinct 
must two contexts be for the current results to be replicated? Further, what characteristics about 
the two states are the cause for the disparate relationships between cultural value 
predispositions and trust between the two states? More specific research should address the 
underlying factors that shape the results found herein in order to better understand how the 
combination of context and perceived value congruence work to impact the relationship 
between values and trust.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Regression Results – Full Sample 
 Dependent variable: Trust in Information Provided by: 
 Energy Industry Environmental Groups Government 
Egalitarianism -0.594*** 1.084*** 0.554*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) 
Individualism 0.660*** -1.123*** -0.780*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) 
Hierarchism 0.407*** -0.303*** 0.045 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) 
Fatalism -0.118 0.366*** 0.234*** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) 
Age -0.008 -0.012* -0.020*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Education 0.017 0.101 0.267*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
Income 0.126** 0.024 0.099* 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) 
Race 0.285 0.633* 0.647* 
 (0.337) (0.334) (0.333) 
Gender -0.267 -0.340* 0.242 
 (0.200) (0.199) (0.197) 
Year 0.142 0.296* 0.397** 
 (0.175) (0.175) (0.172) 
Constant 2.872*** 3.416*** 2.307*** 
 (0.613) (0.614) (0.605) 
Observations 608 610 609 
R2 0.178 0.395 0.229 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.385 0.216 
Residual Std. Error 2.128 (df = 597) 2.133 (df = 599) 2.101 (df = 598) 
F Statistic 12.935*** (df = 10; 597) 39.132*** (df = 10; 599) 17.730*** (df = 10; 598) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 2: Regression Results – Trust in Information from the Energy Industry by 
Subsample 
 Dependent variable: Trust in Information from the Energy Industry 
 
Arkansas 
Compatible 
Subsample 
Arkansas 
Incompatible 
Subsample 
Oregon 
Compatible 
Subsample 
Oregon 
Incompatible 
Subsample 
Egalitarianism -0.574** -1.957*** -0.507*** -0.373 
 (0.226) (0.496) (0.114) (0.274) 
Individualism 0.443* -0.429 0.800*** 0.509* 
 (0.246) (0.607) (0.119) (0.267) 
Hierarchism 0.117 -0.090 0.474*** 0.235 
 (0.218) (0.464) (0.118) (0.296) 
Fatalism 0.052 -0.068 -0.286*** 0.161 
 (0.247) (0.440) (0.108) (0.303) 
Observations 129 33 334 76 
R2 0.134 0.517 0.232 0.207 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.297 0.208 0.085 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.374 (df = 118) 2.094 (df = 22) 1.991 (df = 323) 2.104 (df = 65) 
F Statistic 
1.826* (df = 10; 
118) 
2.354** (df = 10; 22) 
9.760*** (df = 10; 
323) 
1.693 (df = 10; 65) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Age, Education, Income, Race, Gender, and Year were included in the models as 
control variables, but are not displayed here for the sake of clarity. 
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Table 3: Regression Results – Trust in Information from Environmental Groups by 
Subsample 
 Dependent variable: Trust in Information from Environmental Groups 
 
Arkansas 
Compatible 
Subsample 
Arkansas 
Incompatible 
Subsample 
Oregon 
Compatible 
Subsample 
Oregon 
Incompatible 
Subsample 
Egalitarianism 1.010*** 1.202** 1.134*** 1.214*** 
 (0.211) (0.572) (0.116) (0.300) 
Individualism -0.749*** -1.411** -1.146*** -1.552*** 
 (0.229) (0.669) (0.121) (0.292) 
Hierarchism -0.615*** -0.224 -0.350*** -0.038 
 (0.205) (0.534) (0.120) (0.323) 
Fatalism 0.465** 1.027* 0.419*** -0.120 
 (0.230) (0.508) (0.110) (0.331) 
Observations 130 34 334 76 
R2 0.280 0.511 0.471 0.503 
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.299 0.455 0.427 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.227 (df = 119) 2.418 (df = 23) 2.015 (df = 323) 2.297 (df = 65) 
F Statistic 
4.625*** (df = 10; 
119) 
2.404** (df = 10; 23) 
28.766*** (df = 10; 
323) 
6.587*** (df = 10; 
65) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Note:  Age, Education, Income, Race, Gender, and Year were included in the models as 
control variables, but are not displayed here for the sake of clarity. 
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Table 4: Regression Results – Trust in Information from the Government by Subsample 
 Dependent variable: Trust in Information from Government 
 
Arkansas 
Compatible 
Subsample 
Arkansas 
Incompatible 
Subsample 
Oregon 
Compatible 
Subsample 
Oregon 
Incompatible 
Subsample 
Egalitarianism 0.719*** -0.133 0.582*** 0.833*** 
 (0.199) (0.531) (0.122) (0.254) 
Individualism -0.700*** -1.234* -0.720*** -1.374*** 
 (0.216) (0.649) (0.127) (0.247) 
Hierarchism -0.076 -0.179 0.101 -0.065 
 (0.193) (0.497) (0.126) (0.274) 
Fatalism 0.283 0.345 0.296** -0.158 
 (0.216) (0.471) (0.115) (0.280) 
Observations 130 33 334 76 
R2 0.169 0.541 0.241 0.477 
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.333 0.217 0.396 
Residual Std. 
Error 
2.098 (df = 119) 2.242 (df = 22) 2.118 (df = 323) 1.949 (df = 65) 
F Statistic 
2.422** (df = 10; 
119) 
2.594** (df = 10; 22) 
10.249*** (df = 10; 
323) 
5.926*** (df = 10; 
65) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Note:  Age, Education, Income, Race, Gender, and Year were included in the models as 
control variables, but are not displayed here for the sake of clarity. 
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Figure 1: Cultural Theory Dimensions and Cultural Types 
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Figure 2: Model of Hypothesized Relationships between Cultural Values and Trust in 
Information 
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Note:  Full bands display the 95% Confidence Interval for each estimated coefficient. Thicker 
bands display the 50% Confidence Interval. 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimated Effects of Cultural Values on Trust in Information from the Energy 
Industry 
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Note:  Full bands display the 95% Confidence Interval for each estimated coefficient. Thicker 
bands display the 50% Confidence Interval. 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Effects of Cultural Values on Trust in Information from 
Environmental Groups 
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Note:  Full bands display the 95% Confidence Interval for each estimated coefficient. Thicker 
bands display the 50% Confidence Interval. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimated Effects of Cultural Values on Trust in Information from Government 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Dependent Variables and Measures 
 
 
Variable Measure 
Trust in energy industry 
How much would you trust the energy industry for providing 
reliable information about fracking processes and operations?  
(0=No trust whatsoever to 10=Completely trust) 
Trust in environmental 
groups 
How much would you trust environmental groups for providing 
reliable information about fracking processes and operations? 
(0=No trust whatsoever  to 10=Completely trust) 
Trust in government 
How much would you trust government agencies for providing 
reliable information about fracking processes and operations?  
(0=No trust whatsoever to 10=Completely trust) 
Trust in scientists 
How much would you trust scientists and academics for 
providing reliable information about fracking processes and 
operations?  
(0=No trust whatsoever to 10=Completely trust) 
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Appendix 2: Primary Independent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
 
Egalitarianism 
 
Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the 
poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more 
equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Egalitarianism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.78; Public α=0.79) 
 
Individualism 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the 
world.(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people 
succeed or fail on their own. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Individualism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.73; Public α=0.70) 
 
Hierarchism 
Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. (1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do to the best of 
your abilities. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on 
those who break the rules. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Hierarchism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.60; Public α=0.67) 
 
Fatalism 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces 
beyond our control. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Fatalism index Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.68; Public α=0.76) 
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Appendix 3: Moderator Variable and Measure 
 
Variable Measure 
Perceived Value 
Congruence 
How compatible do you feel the common values within your 
community are with your own personal values? (1=Highly 
incompatible to 7=Highly compatible) 
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Appendix 4: Control Variables and Measures 
 
Variable Measure 
Race 1=Non-Hispanic White 
Gender 1=Male 
Age Age in years 
Education 
Level of education (1=Elementary through some high school to 
7=Doctorate (of any type)) 
Income 
Total estimated annual household income (1=less than $20,000 to 
9=$300,000 or more) 
State 0=Oregon; 1=Arkansas 
Year 1=2015-2016; 2=2016-2017 
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Do You Hear What I Hear? An Examination of the Role of Cultural Values, Policy 
Narratives, and Knowledge (In)Congruence in Shaping Preferences toward Regulatory 
Policies on Hydraulic Fracturing 
 
Abstract: The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) is an emerging theoretical framework that 
places the role of narratives at the center of understanding the policy process, with policy 
narratives affecting policy actors’ cognition, reasoning, and attitudes regarding a particular 
policy issue.  However, there is a relative dearth of research examining how policy narratives 
indirectly affect cognition, reasoning, and attitudes. In this paper, we systemically examine the 
role of cultural value predispositions on the formation of policy elites’ preferences toward 
regulatory policy on hydraulic fracturing – an increasingly utilized method of oil and gas 
extraction that has been intensely debated in terms of its risks and benefits – while focusing on 
the moderating effect of their knowledge (in)congruence levels – the degree of accuracy in 
individuals’ self-assessment of their actual knowledge levels – across three culturally nuanced 
policy narratives. For this, we utilize a recently conducted survey experiment on local policy 
elites in Arkansas and Oregon. Broadly, results indicate that the combination of culturally 
nuanced narratives and knowledge (in)congruence impact the relationship between cultural 
value predispositions and fracking policy preference. Implications for the NPF, and the policy 
process more generally, are discussed.  
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Introduction 
Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is an increasingly utilized method of oil and gas extraction that 
has provided access to previously inaccessible reserves of oil and gas around the world 
(Boudet et al. 2014; Clarke et al. 2012; Walser, Pursell, and others 2007). This method has 
been met with a significant amount of controversy, with proponents arguing that its utilization will 
decrease dependence on more carbon intensive electricity generation, help create a more 
secure domestic energy supply, and provide increased economic growth (Boudet et al. 2014; 
Considine, Watson, and Blumsack 2010; Hultman et al. 2011). Others argue that, while local 
benefits such as increased job opportunities and local tax revenues may exist (Kay 2011; 
Kester, Moyer, and Song 2015), local communities may also experience strained infrastructures 
from an influx of workers (J. Jacquet 2009), as well as issues associated with water access and 
availability due to fracking’s high water usage (Boudet et al. 2014; Soeder and Kappel 2009). 
Further, concerns of water contamination  due to methane that is released from gas wells during 
the fracking process, chemical spills, and inadequate treatment of wastewater abound (Kargbo, 
Wilhelm, and Campbell 2010). Because of these potential risks, fracking regulations have been 
implemented at state and local levels (Groeger 2012). 
 With fracking being a relatively new method of gas and oil extraction, the risks and 
benefits associated with the process remain unclear (e.g. U.S EPA 2016). Despite the lack of 
clarity in understanding both the benefits and risks that fracking operations afford to both local 
communities and the nation as a whole, there is considerable debate on each side (i.e. for and 
against) of the fracking question. Because of this, the arguments and narratives associated with 
fracking will potentially have a significant impact on the development and implementation of 
policies regarding its regulation. As such, understanding the role that narratives play in shaping 
policy preferences associated with fracking is imperative.  
In this paper, we examine how policy narratives associated with fracking impact the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences among local 
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policy elites. Further, we examine how an individual’s knowledge (in)congruence levels – the 
degree of accuracy in individuals’ self-assessment of their actual knowledge levels – regarding 
fracking operations and policy impacts the aforementioned relationships. We begin by 
discussing the roles of policy narratives, cultural value predispositions and knowledge 
(in)congruence in shaping policy attitudes and preferences and offer and test related 
hypotheses based upon statistical analyses a recently conducted survey of local policy elites in 
Arkansas and Oregon. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for both policy 
process theory and practice.  
 
Theories and Hypotheses 
The Narrative Policy Framework 
The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Jones and McBeth 2010) operates under the 
assumption that a given policy’s discussion and acceptance is not simply a function of the 
content of that policy, but how that policy is framed (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014). 
Thus, the NPF focuses not on the policy, per se, but instead on the story, or stories, associated 
with it. A given narrative has two main components – form and content. The form of a narrative 
is consistent over time and focuses on the narrative’s structure. The form of a narrative consists 
of the setting (i.e. the specific background and policy context), the characters involved (who may 
be victims, villains, or heroes), the plot (which defines the relationships between the characters 
within the policy setting), and the moral (i.e. the narrative’s promoted policy solution). The 
second component of a narrative – content – varies between and across policy issues and 
topics, as every individual policy debate operates in its own political landscape and includes its 
own set of constraints, players, and stakeholders (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014).  
 In particular regards to the narrative structure, which is our primary concern in this 
paper, the NPF argues the following. First, narratives contain a setting, which includes objects 
such as scientific information, institutional or legal rules, and other generally accepted story 
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components that represent the features of the story context (Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth 
2011). Policy narratives also include at least one character. Often, within a policy narrative, 
there exists at least two characters – a villain who causes harm and a hero who attempts to 
mitigate the harm (potentially) caused by the villain (McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones 2005; 
Shanahan, Jones, and McBeth 2011). A plot that combines the characters and setting is also 
included in policy narratives. These plots often provide an attribution of the cause of damage 
which the narrative references (Stone 2002). Finally, policy narratives include either a proposed 
policy solution or moral of the story (Stone 2002). 
 The NPF draws on a variety of other fields and theories in its consideration(s) of the 
individual. For example, the NPF recognizes both confirmation and disconfirmation biases in 
which evidence that is congruent with the individual’s prior beliefs and understandings is treated 
more positively than information that is incongruent. Similarly, when information that is 
incongruent with currently held views is presented, that information is counter-argued (Lodge 
and Taber 2005; McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014; Taber and Lodge 2006). Individuals also 
choose information sources that are aligned with what they believe, known as selective 
exposure (Kunda 1990; McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014; Taber and Lodge 2006). The NPF 
also discusses the idea of identity-protective cognition (Kahan et al. 2007), wherein selective 
exposure and (dis)confirmation biases operate in such a way as to protect the identity of the 
individual. When information (for example) potentially challenges who a person is, that person 
thinks about that information in such a way as to defend themselves. 
 Combining the structure of policy narratives with its view of the individual, the NPF 
essentially argues that policy narratives are developed in an effort to shape public policy, but 
individuals process narratives differently based on the “fit” between the narrative and the 
individual. Indeed, the NPF offers several hypotheses of relevance to the current research 
based on this “fit” – or lack thereof. Of particular relevance to the current research is that of 
congruence and incongruence. This hypothesis suggests that a narrative is more likely to be 
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persuasive as the perceived congruence between the narrative and the individual’s 
understanding of the world increases (Jones and McBeth 2010; McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 
2014) and has been empirically examined and supported (Husmann 2015; Jones and Song 
2014; McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014).  
Cultural Theory and the Narrative Policy Framework 
One possible issue with examining policy narratives and their effects on individual’s attitudes 
and preferences is that of narrative relativity, wherein it is argued that each interaction between 
an individual and a narrative is unique and thus not generalizable nor testable (Jones and Song 
2014). To address this potential issue, we utilize Grid-Group Cultural Theory (CT), which allows 
us to standardize, at least to some extent, the interactions between narratives and individuals by 
focusing on the cultural value predispositions of individuals and their (in)congruence with the 
values expressed by a given narrative.  
 Cultural Theory (Johnson and Swedlow 2019; Ripberger et al. 2012; Swedlow 2011; 
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990) argues that arguments regarding risks (and policy 
preferences more broadly), not only contain the technical aspects of the issue, but include 
components related to conflicting views of how society would best operate (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982; Kahan et al. 2007). Utilizing two dimensions of social relations – grid and group 
– CT develops a typology consisting of four cultural worldviews – egalitarianism, individualism, 
hierarchism, and fatalism. The first dimension, grid, focuses on the extent to which role 
differentiation constrains an individual’s behavior. The second dimension, group, considers the 
degree to which individuals view themselves to be bound to their social groups (Ney and 
Verweij 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). The distinct worldviews that are derived 
from this typology operate together as a system such that the distinctions between the 
worldviews allows individuals to reinforce their ideological orientations in opposition to others 
and in conjunction with their group. Further, these interactions create a set of four distinct 
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worldviews that shape attitudes and preferences in regard to perceptions of nature as well as 
economic systems (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Tumlison and Song 2019). 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 Egalitarians (low grid, high group) value fairness and equity and often distrust authority. 
In the areas of technological development and economic growth, egalitarians tend to have high 
perceptions of risk, viewing these areas as a threat to nature, which is perceived to be fragile 
and easily damaged. Thus, experimentation with nature is often viewed as unacceptable so as 
not to damage it (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990). Individualists (low grid, low group) view the world as functioning best when 
everyone in society competes and finds success or failure as individuals. Counter to 
egalitarians, individualists view nature as resilient and robust, which makes experimentation 
with nature acceptable (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, 
and Wildavsky 1990). Hierarchs (high grid, high group) place high value on order and view 
following institutional and social rules as necessary for its maintenance. As with individualists, 
hierarchs value wealth creation and view nature as relatively robust. However, hierarchs view 
regulations as being necessary in order to mitigate the risks of potential disasters that may 
disrupt equilibrium and make the future unpredictable (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and 
Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Lastly, fatalists (high grid, low group) view 
the world as unpredictable and outcomes being a function of chance (Dake 1992; Lachapelle, 
Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
 Combining Cultural Theory with the Narrative Policy Framework, narratives can be 
developed that align with each of the four cultural value predispositions, thus creating, at least to 
some extent, narratives that can be considered to operate similarly across individuals who share 
similar worldviews (i.e. narratives that either support or contradict the values held by those 
receiving the narrative). Specifically, in the context of fracking, an egalitarian narrative could be 
crafted which describes organizations aimed at protecting the environment as heroes and 
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promotes a process of equality in decision-making, whereas an individualist narrative would 
describe organizations promoting free enterprise and competition as heroes and the industry 
itself as a primary source of decision-making. Finally, a hierarch narrative would cast those with 
expertise, particularly within government, as heroes, with this expertise being the best guide for 
decision-making associated with fracking policies.   
Actual Knowledge, Perceived Knowledge, Knowledge (In)Congruence, and Decision-
Making 
Both actual and perceived knowledge levels have been found to impact both decision-making 
and outcomes in various ways (e.g. Jaccard, Dodge, and Guilamo-Ramos 2005; Rock, Ireland, 
and Resnick 2003). However, there is a dearth of research that considers these two 
conceptualizations of knowledge together. We argue that the congruence (or lack thereof) 
between actual and perceived knowledge levels is a more informative construct than the 
consideration of the two separately. Knowledge has traditionally been conceptualized and 
measured in two primary ways – assessing knowledge levels via a series of questions about a 
topic (actual knowledge) and assessing an individual’s own perceptions about their knowledge 
levels (Stoutenborough and Vedlitz 2014). These two measurements, however, often provide 
inconsistent results regarding information search, perceived decision outcomes, and other 
behaviors (Raju, Lonial, and Mangold 1995). For example, individuals with higher levels of 
perceived knowledge regarding climate change were not more likely to express concern, 
whereas those with higher actual knowledge levels had higher levels of concern regarding 
climate change (Stoutenborough and Vedlitz 2014).  
 Further demonstrating the role of perceived knowledge on decision-making is how an 
individual’s perceived knowledge levels shape their search for information. In the marketing 
field, for instance, it has been found that those with higher levels of product-relevant perceived 
knowledge utilize different sources of information in making purchase decisions than those with 
lower levels of perceived knowledge (Dodd et al. 2005). Perceived knowledge (but not actual 
114 
 
knowledge) is also argued to shape the environment in which information search is conducted 
such that individuals search for information that is congruent with the perceived knowledge that 
they hold in an effort to participate in self-consistent behavior (Moorman et al. 2004). Not only is 
the process of information search shaped by perceived knowledge levels, but satisfaction with 
decisions is as well. Higher levels of perceived knowledge have been found to increase 
satisfaction with the quality of purchase decisions, whereas actual knowledge levels 
demonstrate no such relationship (Raju, Lonial, and Mangold 1995). 
 We argue that the disparate findings above can be better understood when we consider 
both conceptualizations of knowledge together by developing a 2 x 2 typology with perceived 
knowledge levels on the Y axis and actual knowledge levels on the X axis. This results in four 
general knowledge conditions, two quadrants representing knowledge congruence (i.e. low 
actual and perceived knowledge levels and high actual and perceived knowledge levels) and 
two representing knowledge incongruence. The quadrant with low actual knowledge but high 
perceived knowledge represents an overestimation of one’s own knowledge on a policy issue – 
or “knowledge hubris” – whereas the quadrant with high actual knowledge and low perceived 
knowledge represents an underestimation of one’s own knowledge – or “knowledge humility.” 
The placement of an individual into each of these quadrants would likely lead to different 
outcomes in a variety of domains including benefit and risk perceptions, information seeking, 
learning, and, ultimately, policy preferences – particularly when comparing between the two 
quadrants that represent knowledge incongruence. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Thus, in considering the disparate findings regarding the role(s) of actual and perceived 
knowledge levels on a variety of outcomes, this paper examines how the interaction between 
actual and perceived knowledge levels affects the impact that policy narratives have on policy 
preferences regarding fracking for those holding different cultural value predispositions. 
Specifically, we argue that those demonstrating knowledge hubris, as compared to knowledge 
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humility, will have more motivation to participate in identity-protective cognition, as either 
conflicting or confirmatory information is more likely to potentially challenge or confirm the 
individual’s identity via their perceived knowledge levels regarding fracking. 
Hypotheses 
In combining the previous discussions regarding the Narrative Policy Framework, Cultural 
Theory, and Knowledge (In)Congruence, we develop several broad hypotheses. First, based on 
the above discussion of Cultural Theory, we hypothesize that cultural value predispositions will 
be significantly related to fracking policy preferences (Hypothesis 1). Specifically, we 
hypothesize that egalitarianism will be positively related to fracking policy preferences, as 
egalitarians view nature as fragile and easily damaged, thus would support fracking regulations 
in an effort to protect the environment. Alternatively, we hypothesize that individualism will be 
negatively related to fracking policy preferences, as individualists view nature as robust and not 
easily damaged, making experimentation and the utilization of natural resources acceptable. We 
make no particular hypotheses for hierarchism or fatalism as hierarchs view nature as robust, 
but also are accepting of regulations to prevent disruptions to equilibrium and fatalists view 
outcomes as largely a matter of chance. 
 As discussed above, the NPF discusses how confirmation and disconfirmation biases, 
as well as identity-protective cognition, influence the decision-making process of individuals via 
their interactions with information (i.e. narratives). Identity-protective cognition causes 
individuals to process information in ways that protect who they view themselves to be, and is 
argued to be the mechanism by which confirmation and disconfirmation biases operate within 
the individual (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014). With this in mind, and in conjunction with 
the NPF’s hypothesis that as the perceived congruence between an individual and the narrative 
increases, the more likely the individual is to be persuaded by the narrative increases (Jones 
and McBeth 2010; McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014), we hypothesize that the cultural value 
predispositions held by an individual will have a greater effect on fracking-related policy 
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preferences when the policy narrative and cultural value predispositions of the individuals are 
congruent (Hypothesis 2). More specifically, we expect that the relationship between each of the 
cultural value types (i.e. egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchism) and fracking policy 
preferences will be stronger in the narrative treatment condition that is aligned with each cultural 
type. Thus, we expect egalitarianism to have a stronger relationship with fracking policy 
preferences in the egalitarian narrative treatment, individualism to have a stronger relationship 
with fracking policy preferences in the individualist narrative treatment, and hierarchism to have 
a stronger relationship with fracking policy preferences in the hierarch narrative treatment, as 
compared to the control treatment condition12.  
 It is further argued that those with higher knowledge levels and the strongest prior beliefs 
employ what they know in order to protect their currently held views (McBeth, Jones, and 
Shanahan 2014; Taber and Lodge 2006). However, as discussed above, actual and perceived 
knowledge levels can differently impact attitudes and behaviors. Thus, higher actual knowledge 
levels may not be necessary for an individual to engage in identity-protective cognition. Instead, 
it may be the perceived knowledge levels that an individual holds, we argue, that are the driver 
of identity-protective cognition, which leads us to pay attention to the role of knowledge 
(in)congruence in understanding the role of culturally nuanced narratives on individuals’ policy 
preference formation. Specifically, we argue that those demonstrating knowledge hubris 
associated with fracking are more likely to engage in identity-protective cognition as compared 
to those demonstrating knowledge humility, who, we suggest, are less likely to have the policy-
related identity to protect. Thus, we hypothesize that, in all narrative treatment conditions, the 
 
12 It is important to note that disconfirmation biases have also been argued to impact the efficacy 
of narratives. Specifically, information that is incongruent with an individual’s beliefs is argued to be 
challenged (Taber and Lodge 2006). Within the NPF, it has been specifically argued that incongruent 
narratives will either be ignored or utilized to reinforce existing views, as opposed to the views expressed 
in the narrative, with results somewhat supporting this argument, with individuals being less responsive to 
incongruent story frames (e.g. Jones and Song 2014). As such, we make no specific hypotheses 
regarding incongruent narratives, but do explicitly examine them in our discussion of analyses.   
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relationship between cultural value predispositions and regulatory fracking policy preferences 
will be stronger for those demonstrating knowledge hubris, as compared to those demonstrating 
knowledge humility (Hypothesis 3).13  
(Figure 3 about here) 
Data, Variables, and Measures 
Survey Data 
To test our hypotheses, we collected data via statewide, IRB approved, internet surveys 
distributed to local policy elites14 in Arkansas and Oregon between December 2015 and January 
2016 and again in December 2016 through January 2017 via the survey research firm Qualtrics. 
There were 1,110 total responses to the survey, with more responses from Oregon (825) as 
compared to Arkansas (285). There was a similar number of responses for each time period 
(585 responses from 2015-2016 and 525 responses from 2016-2017).  
The two states were chosen for their distinct contexts, both politically and relating to 
fracking. At the time the survey was conducted, Arkansas was utilizing fracking as a method of 
oil and gas extraction, whereas Oregon lacks economically viable oil and gas resources for 
which fracking could be utilized (EIA 2016). Further, the two states are politically distinct. At the 
time of the survey, the Arkansas delegation to Congress consisted of six Republicans while the 
Oregon delegation consisted of one Republican and seven Democrats (Congress Profiles | US 
House of Representatives n.d.).  
 
 
 
13 It is important to note that we make no hypotheses regarding direct effects of narrative treatments on 
fracking policy preferences. However, we include a discussion regarding the role of narratives specifically 
in shaping fracking policy preferences in our first set of data analyses, as well as in the concluding section 
of this paper. 
14 We conceptualized local policy elites as those individuals who hold both the political resources and 
potential capacity to influence the policy process at the local level (Moyer and Song 2016; Tumlison, 
Moyer, and Song 2017), with a particular emphasis on those likely to be involved in energy policy issues.  
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Experimental Design and Narrative Treatments 
Based on previous approaches which applied Cultural Theory to the development of policy 
narratives (e.g. Jones 2014; Jones, Fløttum, and Gjerstad 2017), we developed culturally 
nuanced narratives such that each narrative aligned with a particular cultural value 
predisposition. Specifically, three narrative treatments were developed – an egalitarian 
narrative, individualist narrative, and hierarch narrative. We did not include a fatalist narrative as 
fatalists are expected to not generally participate in the policy process. Each narrative treatment 
included a distinct cast of heroes and villains, and a moral to the story, which aligned with each 
of the three cultural value types. Focusing on the theorized views of nature for each cultural 
type, as well as a review of fracking-related research (e.g. Boudet et al. 2014; Heikkila et al. 
2014; Kester, Moyer, and Song 2015) characters in each narrative were placed into their 
respective roles as heroes or villains as to align each narrative with its cultural type. The set of 
three characters remained consistent across narrative treatments, with the hero in each 
narrative being cast as a villain in the other two experimental narratives.  Over 75% of the 
narrative content was identical across narratives. Each survey respondent was randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental treatment tracks.  
 In the egalitarian narrative treatment15 the hero is an environmental advocacy 
organization, Food and Water Watch, which focuses on the preservation of environmental 
resources needed to survive (Food and Water Watch 2015), while government interests (i.e. 
Bureau of Land Management) and corporate advocates (i.e. the Cato Institute) are cast as 
villains who will irresponsibly manage the development of fracking operations.  
 In the individualist narrative treatment16 the hero is the Cato Institute, a public policy 
think tank “dedicated to the principles of individuals liberty, limited government, free markets, 
and peace” (Cato Institute n.d.), while environmental groups (i.e. Food and Water Watch) and 
 
15 See Appendix 2 
16 See Appendix 3 
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the government (i.e. Bureau of Land Management) are cast as villains who will overregulate and 
thwart free market competition.  
 In the hierarch narrative treatment17 the hero is the Bureau of Land Management, which 
is cast as a government organization possessing the expertise necessary to appropriately 
manage fracking, whereas corporate advocates (i.e. the Cato Institute) and environmental 
interests (i.e. Food and Water Watch) are cast as villains seeking to promote their own interests.  
 Each survey respondent was randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions – 
either one of the three aforementioned narratives or a control condition which only included 
standard facts and was presented to all survey respondents before receiving the narrative 
treatments (for those respondents not randomly assigned to the control treatment condition).  
Primary Independent Variables and Measures 
The primary independent variables for our analyses are individually held cultural value 
predispositions (i.e. egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism). We utilized a 12-
item scale that has been previously validated (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2014; Jones and Song 
2014; Ripberger et al. 2014; Song 2014; Song, Silva, and Jenkins-Smith 2014). Each of the four 
cultural value orientations were represented by three items in the scale (see Table 1). For each 
of the twelve items, respondents rated their level of agreement on a seven-point scale ranging 
from 1 (=Strongly disagree) to 7 (=Strongly agree). We conducted a factor analysis optimizing 
the four-factor solution wherein the three items representing the cultural values loaded onto their 
respective dimension. Factor scores were then calculated for each respondent for each of the 
four latent dimensions. These scores were used as our measure for each of the four cultural 
value predispositions. The items demonstrated acceptable reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha 
scores ranging from 0.63 to 0.79.  
(Table 1 about here) 
 
17 See Appendix 4 
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Moderator Variable, Control Variables, and Measures 
Our moderator variable for the relationship between cultural value predispositions and fracking 
policy preferences is knowledge (in)congruence. This variable was created via the combination 
of our measures for actual and perceived knowledge. Actual knowledge scores were calculated 
from a set of seven True/False questions that related to energy and fracking issues in the 
respondent’s state. The number of correct responses was converted into a percentage score. 
Our measure of perceived knowledge was derived from two questions asking respondents how 
well they were informed on (1) issues regarding fracking operations and (2) energy policy in 
general, particularly focusing on fracking. Each perceived knowledge item was measured on an 
eight-point scale anchored at 0 (=Not at all informed) and 7 (=Completely informed). These 
items were combined and converted into a percentage score as well so as to align with our 
actual knowledge measure. Our knowledge (in)congruence score was calculated by subtracting 
the actual knowledge score from the perceived knowledge score. Thus, higher scores indicated 
knowledge hubris, while lower scores indicated knowledge humility (see Table 2). 
(Table 2 about here) 
 We also included control variables, including gender, race, state of the respondent, age, 
education, income, and year the survey was taken. Respondents were predominantly white 
(92%), male (64%), and from Oregon (74%). The average age of the respondents was 54 years.  
(Table 3 about here) 
Dependent Variable and Measure 
The dependent variable for our analyses is fracking regulation policy preference. For this 
measure, we developed an index calculated as the mean of the responses to five items asking 
respondents to rate their support for various fracking regulatory policies (see Table 4) on a 
seven-point scale anchored at 1 (=Strongly oppose) and 7 (=Strongly support). The five items 
were developed based on policies that have been either proposed or implemented at local and 
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state levels. Cronbach’s alpha for the five items was 0.83, indicating that the items are 
acceptably reliable.  
(Table 4 about here) 
Statistical Analyses and Results 
To examine our hypotheses regarding the role of knowledge (in)congruence of the efficacy of 
policy narratives across different cultural value predispositions we conduct our analyses in three 
phases. First, we utilize Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to examine the relationship 
between our cultural value predisposition variables (i.e. egalitarianism, individualism, 
hierarchism, and fatalism) and the fracking policy preferences of local policy elites in Arkansas 
and Oregon within each experimental condition (i.e. Control Treatment, Egalitarian Narrative, 
Individualist Narrative, and Hierarch Narrative). Next, we examine the same relationships while 
dividing the sample into those local policy elites demonstrating knowledge humility and those 
demonstrating knowledge hubris in order to examine the role of cultural value predispositions 
and narratives in shaping fracking policy preferences when local policy elites demonstrate 
knowledge hubris versus knowledge humility. Finally, we utilize Bayesian posterior simulation to 
examine the predicted fracking policy preferences of a “prototypical” egalitarian, individualist, 
and hierarch demonstrating knowledge hubris versus knowledge humility in each of our 
experimental treatments. 
Regressions 
First, as presented in Table 5 and Figure 4, we utilize OLS linear regression to examine the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences in each of 
the four narrative treatment conditions in order to examine our first two hypotheses (i.e. whether 
(1) cultural value predispositions affect fracking policy preferences and whether (2) the 
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relationship between cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences is different 
under different narrative treatment conditions)18.   
Egalitarianism is significantly related to fracking policy preferences in all narrative 
treatments, supporting Hypothesis 1. The estimated effect of egalitarianism on fracking policy 
preference was similar in the control treatment (β = 0.371) and individualist narrative (β = 
0.364), slightly higher in the egalitarian narrative (β = 0.468), and over twice as large in the 
hierarch narrative (β = 0.758) as compared to the control treatment, counter to Hypothesis 2, 
but providing support to the incongruent narrative hypothesis (see footnote 12). Individualism 
was also significantly related to fracking policy preferences in all narrative treatment conditions, 
again supporting Hypothesis 1. The estimated effect of individualism on fracking policy 
preferences was similar in the control treatment (β = -0.346) and the egalitarian narrative 
treatment (β = -0.352), slightly higher in the individualist narrative condition (β = -0.469), and 
largest in the hierarch narrative condition (β = -0.593), providing some support for Hypothesis 2, 
and also providing support for the incongruent narrative hypothesis. Hierarchism was only 
significantly related to fracking policy preferences in the control treatment condition (β = -0.261). 
Fatalism was not significantly related to fracking policy preferences in any of the narrative 
experiment conditions.  
It is also important to note that the variance in fracking policy preferences explained by 
each of the models differs across treatment conditions. In the control treatment, the adjusted R2 
is 0.236. In the egalitarian narrative, the adjusted R2 is virtually identical (0.241). However, as 
compared to the control treatment, the adjusted R2 increases to 0.327 in the individualist 
narrative, and to 0.460 in the hierarch narrative, indicating that, while there was no direct effect 
 
18 We also ran a regression model with the same set of variables but utilized the narrative treatment 
conditions as a factor variable predicting fracking policy preferences. In this model, results supported 
Hypothesis 1 and there was no significant effect found for any narrative treatment condition as compared 
to the control treatment, indicating no direct effect of the narrative treatments on fracking policy 
preferences.  
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of the narrative treatments on fracking policy preferences, the narrative treatments do in fact 
play a role in shaping fracking policy preferences of local policy elites.  
(Table 5 and Figure 4 about here) 
 In the next set of analyses, we divide the samples into those local policy elites 
demonstrating knowledge hubris and those demonstrating knowledge humility in order to 
examine Hypothesis 3 (i.e. whether knowledge (in)congruence affects the relationship between 
cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences across treatment conditions). 
Thus, we have two subsamples for each narrative experimental condition. The results are 
discussed separately below for egalitarianism and individualism.19 
Egalitarianism, Knowledge (In)Congruence, and Policy Narratives 
Egalitarianism demonstrated similar relationships as demonstrated in the analysis above in the 
knowledge hubris subsamples (see Figure 5). For local policy elites who overestimate their 
knowledge levels regarding fracking, egalitarianism was significantly related to fracking policy 
preferences in all four narrative experiment conditions. The estimated effect of egalitarianism in 
the control treatment (β = 0.428) and individualist narrative (β = 0.415) were similar, whereas 
the estimated effect in the egalitarian narrative (β = 0.580) was slightly higher, with the 
estimated effect in the hierarch narrative (β = 0.843) being approximately twice as large as 
compared to the control treatment. Egalitarianism was not significantly related to fracking policy 
preferences in any narrative experiment condition for those local policy elites demonstrating 
knowledge humility. Together, these results provide support for Hypothesis 3, with 
egalitarianism being significantly related to fracking policy preferences for local policy elites 
demonstrating knowledge hubris, but not for those demonstrating knowledge humility.  
 
19 Hierarchism and fatalism are not discussed in the following analyses due to the lack of significant 
results. Fatalism was not significantly related to fracking policy preferences in any of the analyses. 
Hierarchism was not significant in any subsample analysis, but was approaching significance (p = 0.065) 
in the knowledge hubris subsample in the control treatment condition.  
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(Figure 5 about here) 
Individualism, Knowledge (In)Congruence, and Policy Narratives 
For local policy elites who overestimated their knowledge levels regarding fracking, 
individualism was significantly related to fracking policy preferences in all four narrative 
experiment conditions (see Figure 6). The estimated effect of individualism on fracking policy 
preferences was lowest in the control treatment condition (β = -0.421). The egalitarian narrative 
condition (β = -0.475) and the individualist narrative condition (β = -0.499) were slightly higher, 
with the estimated effect of individualism on fracking policy preferences being highest in the 
hierarch narrative condition (β = -0680). As with egalitarianism, individualism was not 
significantly related to fracking policy preferences for local policy elites demonstrating 
knowledge humility in any of the four narrative experiment treatment conditions.  Together, 
these results provide support for Hypothesis 3, with individualism being significantly related to 
fracking policy preferences for local policy elites demonstrating knowledge hubris, but not for 
those demonstrating knowledge humility.  
(Figure 6 about here) 
Bayesian Posterior Simulations 
The final phase of analyses consisted of utilizing Bayesian posterior simulations in order to 
examine the predicted distributions of fracking policy preferences among local policy elites 
representing a “prototypical” individual of each cultural value type – egalitarian, individualist, and 
hierarch (fatalist was not included as there was no fatalist narrative experimental condition and 
fatalism was never significantly related to fracking policy preferences). To do this, a score of one 
standard deviation above the mean factor score for the cultural value predisposition of interest 
was assigned, along with a score of one standard deviation below the mean factor score for the 
remaining three cultural value types. This was done to accurately represent the concept that 
each of the four cultural types are derived both from accepting the biases and worldviews of 
their own cultural type while also rejecting the biases and worldviews of the other cultural types. 
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Estimated regression coefficients were generated from 1,000 simulations for each cultural type 
(e.g. egalitarian, individualist, hierarch), which generated distributions of the predicted fracking 
policy preferences of local policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon for each of the cultural 
prototypes in each of the subsamples (Moyer and Song 2016; Tumlison et al. 2018), as shown 
in Figure 720. Predicted policy preference scores are displayed on the horizontal axis while the 
distribution probability density is displayed on the vertical axis.  
 In all distributions, prototypical egalitarians have the highest levels of predicted support 
for regulatory fracking policies, as expected (Hypothesis 1). Comparing prototypical egalitarians 
demonstrating knowledge hubris versus those demonstrating knowledge humility, the predicted 
fracking policy support scores are lower for those demonstrating knowledge humility in all four 
narrative experiment conditions, providing further support for Hypothesis 3. Alternatively, 
prototypical individualists had the lowest predicted policy support scores in all subsamples 
except for in the egalitarian narrative – humility group subsample, where predicted scores for a 
prototypical hierarch were lower than those of a prototypical individualist, largely supporting 
Hypothesis 1.  
 In the control treatment condition predicted fracking policy support score distributions 
were similar between the humility and hubris groups for prototypical individualists. Predicted 
fracking policy support scores for prototypical egalitarians decreased from the humility 
subsample compared to the hubris subsample, with the average predicted score for a 
prototypical egalitarian being 6.83 in the hubris subsample and 6.29 in the humility subsample. 
Alternatively, predicted fracking policy support scores increased for a prototypical hierarch in the 
humility subsample as compared to the hubris subsample, with the average predicted fracking 
policy support score for a prototypical hierarch in the hubris subsample being 5.0 versus 5.70 in 
 
20 These simulations were conducted utilizing a simplified model that only included the four cultural value 
predisposition variables as independent variables. This was done to reduce the complexity of the 
simulations, as well as due to the control variables, aside from gender, included in previous models 
demonstrating no consistent effects on fracking policy preferences (see Table 5).  
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the humility subsample, again supporting Hypothesis 3, indicating that knowledge 
(in)congruence affects the relationships between cultural value predispositions and fracking 
policy preferences.  
 In the egalitarian narrative experiment condition the average predicted fracking policy 
support score for a prototypical egalitarian decreased from the hubris subsample (6.90) to the 
humility subsample (6.01). Alternatively, the average predicted fracking policy support score 
increased from the hubris subsample (4.50) to the humility subsample (5.65) for a prototypical 
individualist. Average predicted policy support scores for a prototypical hierarch were essentially 
the same in the two subsamples. Together, these results again largely support Hypothesis 3 
regarding the role of knowledge (in)congruence in shaping fracking policy preferences. 
 In the individualist narrative experiment condition the average predicted fracking policy 
support score for a prototypical egalitarian decreased from the hubris subsample (6.60) to the 
humility subsample (5.89). The average predicted policy support scores for individualists (4.48 
vs 4.70) and hierarchs (5.16 vs 5.33) were both slightly higher in the hubris subsample as 
compared to the humility subsample. Thus, Hypothesis 3 found some support in the individualist 
narrative condition (i.e. for prototypical egalitarians), but not for all cultural value predispositions 
(i.e. prototypical individualist or hierarch).  
 Finally, in the hierarch narrative experiment condition the average predicted fracking 
policy support score for a prototypical egalitarian decreased slightly from the hubris subsample 
(6.96) to the humility subsample (6.51), and increased slightly from the hubris subsample (4.14) 
to the humility subsample (4.41) for prototypical individualists. The predicted fracking policy 
support scores were virtually identical for prototypical hierarchs between the hubris subsample 
(5.41) and the humility subsample (5.43). Together, these results provide mixed, and moderate, 
support for Hypothesis 3. 
(Figure 7 about here) 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
Overall, our findings indicate that the (in)congruence of an individual’s actual and perceived 
knowledge levels impact the relationships between cultural value predispositions and fracking 
policy preferences of local policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon. Further, culturally nuanced 
narratives, while demonstrating no direct impact on fracking policy preferences, did affect the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences. As 
discussed above, estimated effects of cultural value predispositions, particularly egalitarianism 
and individualism, varied depending on which narrative was presented. While some of these 
differences were relatively small, when viewed together as a system (e.g. the Bayesian 
posterior simulations, above), the impacts of the narrative experimental treatments can be seen, 
with changes in the predicted policy preference levels for each cultural type shifting across 
narrative treatments. Similarly, the relationships of the distributions of each of the three cultural 
value predispositions as compared to each other differ across narrative conditions (see Figure 
7). These relationships are particularly noticeable in the knowledge hubris subsamples. Finally, 
the predicted policy preference distributions differed between the knowledge hubris and 
knowledge humility subsamples in each of the narrative conditions.  
 Our first hypothesis received support, with egalitarianism and individualism both being 
significantly related to fracking policy preferences in all four narrative treatment conditions. Our 
second hypothesis received mixed support. Value congruent narratives did demonstrate an 
increased estimated effect size of the relevant cultural value predispositions variable (e.g. 
egalitarianism in the egalitarian narrative treatment) as compared to the control treatment 
condition. However, the strongest relationship between both egalitarianism and individualism 
scores and fracking policy preferences was found in the hierarch narrative treatment condition. 
It is possible that this is due to the hierarch narrative activating identity-protective cognition via 
disconfirmation bias to protect worldviews based on the “grid” dimension of Cultural Theory. 
Finally, our third hypothesis received strong support, with both egalitarianism and individualism 
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only being significantly associated with fracking policy preferences among those local policy 
elites demonstrating knowledge hubris, whereas neither cultural value predisposition was 
significantly related to fracking policy preferences among those policy elites demonstrating 
knowledge humility. 
 The results of this study have several implications for both theory and practice. First, the 
current results indicate the knowledge (in)congruence strongly impacts the effect of cultural 
value predispositions on fracking policy preferences. Predicted distributions of fracking policy 
preferences between similar individuals (i.e. a prototypical egalitarian, individualist, or hierarch) 
are different based on whether the individual demonstrates knowledge hubris or knowledge 
humility, with the knowledge humility distributions consistently having smaller overlaps between 
cultural types as compared to the knowledge hubris distributions. Thus, local policy elites 
demonstrating knowledge hubris tend to have relatively similar levels of policy support as those 
who share their cultural value predispositions as compared to those demonstrating knowledge 
humility.  
 Second, the current results provide some nuance to the congruence hypothesis offered 
by the NPF. While the value-congruent narrative treatments did slightly strengthen the 
relationship between both egalitarianism and individualism and fracking policy preferences, the 
value-incongruent hierarch narrative treatment exhibited the strongest relationships between 
these two cultural value predisposition variables and fracking policy preferences. Alternatively, 
there were negligible differences between the estimated effects of egalitarianism on fracking 
policy preference in the control condition versus the value-incongruent individualist narrative 
treatment, and the estimated effects of individualism on fracking policy preference in the control 
condition versus the value-incongruent egalitarian condition. Thus, there appears to be times 
when incongruent narratives serve to more strongly reinforce the effects of cultural value 
predispositions on policy preference as compared to value-congruent narratives.  
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 Third, the current results provide an additional way to conceptualize the effects of 
narratives on policy preferences (as well as other potential dependent variables of interest). In 
hypothesizing and testing narrative effects the NPF, and extant research utilizing the NPF, 
focuses on direct effects of narratives on a given dependent variable (Jones and McBeth 2010; 
McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014). However, the results here indicate that narratives may 
have meaningful effects in shaping policy preferences outside of direct effects tested via 
traditional analyses (e.g. regression, ANOVA). Specifically, the variance explained by the same 
set of model variables, tested across narrative treatments, is distinct across models. While there 
were no direct effects of the narrative treatments, as compared to the control treatment, on 
fracking policy preferences, the explained variance was approximately twice as large for 
respondents who received the hierarch narrative treatment as compared to the control 
treatment, and over 33% larger for those who received the individualist narrative treatment as 
compared to the control treatment. It is therefore important that researchers utilizing the 
Narrative Policy Framework expand the scope of how to examine and interpret the effects of 
different narratives on attitude formation. 
Overall, the current paper finds mixed support for the Narrative Policy Framework’s view 
of the effects of policy narratives on policy preferences, suggesting a need for further 
exploration and elaboration on the interaction between the individual and narrative, specifically 
related to the ways in which knowledge (in)congruence and values interact in shaping a given 
policy narrative’s efficacy.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Primary Independent Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Egalitarianism 
 
Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly 
agree) 
It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the 
poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more 
equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Egalitarianism index Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.79) 
 
Individualism 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the 
world.(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people 
succeed or fail on their own. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Individualism index Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.75) 
 
Hierarchism 
Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. (1=Strongly 
disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do to the best of your 
abilities. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on 
those who break the rules. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Hierarchism index Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.63) 
 
Fatalism 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. (1=Strongly disagree to 
7=Strongly agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces 
beyond our control. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance. 
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) 
Fatalism index Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.71) 
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Table 2: Knowledge Measures 
 
Variable Measure 
 
 
Level of knowledge 
of energy policy 
issues 
 
 
Most scientists and energy experts agree that the estimates for natural gas 
reserves in the U.S. have increased in the past decade. (0=False; 1=True*AR 
*OR) 
Coal-fired electric power plants in Arkansas/Oregon supply the major source of 
the state’s electricity. (0=False*OR; 1=True*AR) 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 clearly states that the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) holds comprehensive federal regulatory authorities on 
fracking practices. (0=False*OR *AR; 1=True) 
Currently, there is no government-declared moratorium placed on new injection 
wells (for natural gas drilling) in Arkansas/Oregon. (0=False*AR; 1=True*OR) 
Currently, the majority of all U.S. natural gas production is attributed to shale 
gas from fracking operations. (0=False*OR  *AR; 1=True) 
Due to energy security concerns, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
currently enforces an absolute ban on natural gas export. (0=False*OR *AR; 
1=True) 
The first commercially successful fracking operation in the United States took 
place several decades ago. (0=False; 1=True*AR *OR) 
Knowledge index Percentage of correct answers 
Perceived 
Knowledge Energy 
On a scale from zero to seven where zero means not at all informed and seven 
means completely informed, how well informed do you consider yourself to be 
about energy policy in general? 
Perceived 
Knowledge Fracking 
Operations 
On a scale from zero to seven where zero means not at all informed and seven 
means completely informed, how well informed do you consider yourself to be 
about fracking operations? 
Perceived 
Knowledge Index 
Sum of Perceived Knowledge items above converted to a percentage 
Knowledge 
Hubris/Humility 
Index 
Perceived Knowledge Index score minus Knowledge Index 
Note: * denotes correct answer (AR=Arkansas; OR=Oregon). 
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Table 3: Control Variables and Measures 
Variable Measure 
Race 1=Non-Hispanic White 
Gender 1=Male 
Age Age in years 
Education 
Level of education (1=Elementary through some high school to 
7=Doctorate (of any type)) 
Income 
Total estimated annual household income (1=less than $20,000 to 
9=$300,000 or more) 
State 0=Oregon; 1=Arkansas 
Year 1=2015-2016; 2=2016-2017 
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Table 4: Fracking Regulation Policy Preference Measures 
Variable Measure 
 
 
Fracking 
Regulation Policy 
Preference 
 
 
How do you feel about a “disclosure rule” that requires natural gas 
drilling companies to disclose the chemicals they inject underground in 
the frilling process because of the public’s right to know about the 
health risks posed by these chemicals? (1=Strongly oppose to 
7=Strongly support) 
How do you feel about prohibiting hydraulic fracturing within 2,500 feet 
of a water well, lake, reservoir, spring, impoundment, or the permitted 
intake of a stream that serves as a primary source for a community 
water system? (1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly support) 
How do you feel about a “fracking moratorium” that bans hydraulic 
fracturing until more is known about its potential impacts and what 
techniques may effectively protect public health and the environment? 
(1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly support) 
How do you feel about setting up a “zoning limit” that restricts fracking 
operations to specific areas away from established residential or 
commercial areas in your community? (1=Strongly oppose to 
7=Strongly support) 
How do you feel about establishing regulations on fracking operations 
by imposing limits on noise levels, odors, visual impacts, traffic loads, 
road construction and maintenance associated with fracking practices 
in your community? (1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly support) 
Fracking 
Regulation Policy 
Index* 
Index of the above five items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83) 
  * Higher scores indicate higher levels of support for fracking regulations 
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Table 5: Regression by Narrative Treatment 
 Dependent variable: Fracking Policy Preference 
  
 Control  
Treatment 
Egalitarian  
Narrative 
Individualist Narrative Hierarch Narrative 
 
Egalitarianism 0.371*** 0.468*** 0.364*** 0.758*** 
 (0.113) (0.103) (0.098) (0.093) 
     
Individualism -0.346*** -0.352*** -0.469*** -0.593*** 
 (0.105) (0.123) (0.098) (0.095) 
     
Hierarchism -0.261** -0.073 0.016 0.026 
 (0.120) (0.110) (0.108) (0.090) 
     
Fatalism 0.059 0.074 0.127 0.107 
 (0.104) (0.109) (0.102) (0.094) 
     
Age -0.018** 0.004 -0.008 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Income 0.159** -0.005 -0.090 0.016 
 (0.080) (0.071) (0.060) (0.054) 
     
Education 0.054 -0.110 0.137* -0.184*** 
 (0.085) (0.076) (0.070) (0.068) 
     
State 0.171 0.009 0.146 0.095 
 (0.239) (0.249) (0.210) (0.191) 
     
Year -0.128 -0.332 0.219 0.246 
 (0.216) (0.211) (0.188) (0.176) 
     
Race -0.467 0.153 0.460 0.752* 
 (0.461) (0.406) (0.306) (0.381) 
     
Gender -0.376 -0.607** -0.536** -0.401** 
 (0.261) (0.247) (0.219) (0.190) 
 
Observations 137 134 146 141 
R2 0.298 0.303 0.378 0.503 
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.241 0.327 0.460 
Residual Std. Error 1.185 (df = 125) 1.201 (df = 122) 1.079 (df = 134) 0.997 (df = 129) 
F Statistic 4.828*** (df = 11; 125) 4.832*** (df = 11; 122) 7.396*** (df = 11; 134) 11.861*** (df = 11; 129) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 1: Cultural Theory Dimensions and Cultural Types 
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Figure 2: Basic Typology of Knowledge (In)Congruence 
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Figure 3: Model of Predicted Moderated Effects of Cultural Value Predispositions on 
Regulatory Fracking Policy Preference 
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Figure 4: Estimated Effect of Cultural Value Predispositions on Fracking Policy 
Preference by Narrative Treatment 
 
 
 
Fatalism
Hierarchism
Individualism
Egalitarianism
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Estimate
Model
Control Treatment
Egalitarian Narrative
Individualist Narrative
Hierarch Narrative
150 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimated Effect of Egalitarianism on Fracking Policy Preference by Narrative 
Treatment and Knowledge Hubris/Humility 
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Figure 6: Estimated Effect of Individualism on Fracking Policy Preference by Narrative 
Treatment and Knowledge Hubris/Humility 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Control Treatment 
As briefly explained previously, hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as “fracking,” is a 
method for extracting oil and gas from rock deep beneath the earth’s surface. Fracking 
combines top-down and sideways drilling with a process known as hydraulic fracturing – a high 
pressure injection of water, sand, and chemicals intended to extract oil and gas from the rock 
below. Mining companies have used fracking since the 1950’s, but new technologies have 
made fracking more profitable. Because of this, natural gas produced from fracking increased 
20 fold in the last decade. The result has been lower energy prices for many Americans. 
Oil and gas companies often lease the land used for fracking from private owners. For 
some leaseholders, payments from fracking activities are sizable. These leases are frequently 
located in rural communities where agriculture is the main industry, leading some to question 
the safety of fracking. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently 
investigating concerns that fracking damages the environment and harms humans. One focus of 
the EPA’s fracking investigation is to determine whether chemical spills and high-pressure 
injection fluids have contaminated nearby water sources. 
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Appendix 2. Egalitarian Narrative Treatment 
As briefly explained previously, hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as “fracking,” is a 
method for extracting oil and gas from rock deep beneath the earth’s surface. Fracking 
combines top-down and sideways drilling with a process known as hydraulic fracturing – a high 
pressure injection of water, sand, and chemicals intended to extract oil and gas from the rock 
below. Mining companies have used fracking since the 1950’s, but new technologies have 
made fracking more profitable. Because of this, natural gas produced from fracking increased 
20 fold in the last decade. The result has been lower energy prices for many Americans. Oil and 
gas companies often lease the land used for fracking from private owners. For some 
leaseholders, payments from fracking activities are sizable. These leases are frequently located 
in rural communities where agriculture is the main industry, leading some to question the safety 
of fracking. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently investigating concerns 
that fracking damages the environment and harms humans. One focus of the EPA’s fracking 
investigation is to determine whether chemical spills and high-pressure injection fluids have 
contaminated nearby water sources. 
As you can see, there is concern about fracking and its potential benefits and damages 
in the United States. It is apparent that more investigation should occur into its application. 
However, progress in unbiased investigation is made nearly impossible by the efforts of 
destructive interests. 
Government interests, represented by agencies like the Bureau of Land Management 
are attempting to use fracking policies to promote their own interests. They push for programs 
that solidify bureaucratic control and increase the size and cost of the federal government. 
These programs include more reliance on government agencies to regulate, and some 
advocate for new types of environmental regulation. They argue that due to the complexity of 
fracking activities, only “experts” employed by the government can fully understand its impacts.  
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Corporate advocates, represented by organizations like the radical Cato Institute are 
attempting to use fracking to exploit people for profit. The groups demand radical policies that 
destroy rural communities and damage human health. They put faith in greedy corporations; a 
poorly informed public and the more dangerous positions advocate for reduced regulations that 
allows them to pollute the environment for profit. They argue that due to the failure of the 
community-level efforts, only competitive markets can be trusted to handle fracking policies.  
It is clear that both big government and free market types are using fracking to push a 
destructive agenda that obstructs progress. To solve this problem, we must invoke the value 
that has always served humanity the best; the value is our historical reliance on equal 
participation. Community-led fracking investigation relies on this value by taking advantage of 
equal participation that generates homegrown knowledge that allows us to fully understand the 
impacts of fracking. Thankfully groups like Food and Water Watch have been tirelessly 
advocating for this solution. 
The potential benefits and damages from fracking remind us all that the world is fragile. 
When humanity introduces technologies that disturb the balance of nature, the environment will 
always retaliate for our carelessness. Community-led fracking investigation and homegrown 
decision-making provides a clear path for the public to have the knowledge necessary to take 
action about fracking practices. Government expansion and bottomless corporate greed are not 
the answer. 
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Appendix 3. Individualist Narrative Treatment 
As briefly explained previously, hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as “fracking,” is 
a method for extracting oil and gas from rock deep beneath the earth’s surface. Fracking 
combines top-down and sideways drilling with a process known as hydraulic fracturing – a high 
pressure injection of water, sand, and chemicals intended to extract oil and gas from the rock 
below. Mining companies have used fracking since the 1950’s, but new technologies have 
made fracking more profitable. Because of this, natural gas produced from fracking increased 
20 fold in the last decade. The result has been lower energy prices for many Americans.  
Oil and gas companies often lease the land used for fracking from private owners. For 
some leaseholders, payments from fracking activities are sizable. These leases are frequently 
located in rural communities where agriculture is the main industry, leading some to question 
the safety of fracking. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently 
investigating concerns that fracking damages the environment and harms humans. One focus of 
the EPA’s fracking investigation is to determine whether chemical spills and high-pressure 
injection fluids have contaminated nearby water sources. 
As you can see, there is concern about fracking and its expected benefits and costs in 
the United States. It is apparent that more analysis should occur into its application. However, 
progress in unbiased analysis is made nearly impossible by the efforts of destructive interests. 
Government interests, represented by agencies like Bureau of Land Management are 
attempting to use fracking policies to promote their own interests. They push for programs that 
solidify bureaucratic control and increase the size and cost of the federal government. These 
programs include more reliance on government agencies to regulate, and some advocate for 
new types of environmental regulation. They argue that due to the scope of fracking activities, 
only “qualified” government authorities can fully understand its impacts. 
Environmental advocates, represented by organizations like the radical Food and Water 
Watch, are attempting to use fracking to destroy our capitalist system. The groups demand 
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radical policies that destroy free competition and make America worse off. They put faith in 
socialized community activism; invasive environmental laws and the more dangerous positions 
advocate for communities that are controlled by environmentalists. They argue that due to the 
failure of the free markets, only affected communities can be trusted to handle fracking policies. 
It is clear that both the big government and radical environmental types are using 
fracking to push a destructive agenda that obstructs progress. To solve this problem, we must 
invoke the value that has always served humans the best; that value is our historical reliance on 
free competition. Industry-led fracking analysis relies on this value by taking advantage of free 
competition to generate practical knowledge that allows us to fully understand the impacts of 
fracking. Thankfully groups like The Cato Institute have been tirelessly advocating for this 
solution. 
The expected benefits and costs from fracking remind us that the world is rapidly 
changing. When change presents us with complex problems, we can only prosper if we are free 
to adapt to opportunities. Industry-led fracking analysis and practical decision-making provides a 
clear path for corporations to freely adapt, providing innovative, safe, and cost-effective fracking 
practices. Radical ideology and more big government are not the answer. 
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Appendix 4. Hierarch Narrative Treatment 
As briefly explained previously, hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as “fracking,” is a method 
for extracting oil and gas from rock deep beneath the earth’s surface. Fracking combines top-
down and sideways drilling with a process known as hydraulic fracturing – a high-pressure 
injection of water, sand, and chemicals intended to extract oil and gas from the rock below. 
Mining companies have used fracking since the 1950’s, but new technologies have made 
fracking more profitable. Because of this, natural gas produced from fracking increased 20 fold 
in the last decade. The result has been lower energy prices for many Americans. 
Oil and gas companies often lease the land used for fracking from private owners. For 
some leaseholders, payments from fracking activities are sizable. These leases are frequently 
located in rural communities where agriculture is the main industry, leading some to question 
the safety of fracking. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently 
investigating concerns that fracking damages the environment and harms humans. One focus of 
the EPA’s fracking investigation is to determine whether chemical spills and high-pressure 
injection fluids have contaminated nearby water sources. 
As you can see, there is concern about fracking and its likely benefits and consequences 
in the United States. It is apparent that more oversight should occur into its application. 
However, progress in unbiased oversight is made nearly impossible by the efforts of destructive 
interests. 
Environmental interests, represented by groups like Food and Water Watch are 
attempting to use fracking policies to promote their own interests. They push for programs that 
ignore scientific evidence and dismiss how truly complex the US energy landscape is. These 
programs include more reliance on collective experiences and some advocate for the 
suspension of all fracking activities. They argue that due to the nature of fracking activities, only 
“enlightened” local communities can fully understand its impacts. 
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Corporate advocates, represented by organizations like the radical Cato Institute are 
attempting to use fracking to help generate larger profits. The groups demand radical policies 
that ignore societal responsibility and damage human health. They put faith in unregulated 
corporations; a misinformed public and the more dangerous positions advocate for reduced 
regulations that allows them to pollute the environment for profit. They argue that due to the 
failure of the government regulations only competitive markets can be trusted to handle fracking 
policies. 
It is clear that both radical environmentalists and free market types are using fracking to 
push a destructive agenda that obstructs progress. To solve this problem, we must invoke the 
value that has always served Americans the best; that value is our historical reliance on 
scientific expertise. Government-led fracking oversight relies on this value by taking advantage 
of scientific expertise to generate reliable knowledge that allows us to fully understand the 
impacts of fracking. Thankfully agencies like the Bureau of Land Management have been 
tirelessly advocating for this solution. 
The likely benefits and consequences from fracking remind us that the world is delicately 
balanced. When mankind introduces technologies that may disturb this balance, we must rely 
on our expertise to bring things back into order. Government-led fracking research and 
centralized decision-making provides a clear path for the government to reestablish control 
through expert management of fracking practices. Radical ideology and more corporate greed 
are not the answer. 
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Conclusion 
Overall, the three papers in this dissertation contribute to understandings of the decision-making 
processes associated with hydraulic fracturing, with a particular focus on local policy elites.  
 The first paper demonstrates that cultural value predispositions shape trust in 
information regarding hydraulic fracturing, which in turn shapes benefit-risk perceptions 
associated with fracking. Further, while this process is similar between local policy elites and the 
general public, trust – particularly distrust – plays a stronger mediating role for local policy elites 
as compared to the general public. Specifically, for both local policy elites and the general 
public, egalitarians view fracking as more risky than beneficial, partially due to their trust in 
information from environmental groups and distrust in information from the energy industry. 
Alternatively, individualists view fracking as more beneficial than risky, partially due to their 
distrust in information from environmental groups and trust in information from the energy 
industry. Similarly, hierarchs view fracking as relatively beneficial due to their trust in information 
from the energy industry and distrust in information from environmental groups (for local policy 
elites, but not for the general public). This mediating role of trust is, I argue, due to the perceived 
congruence in values between the individual and the potential source of information. Broadly, 
these findings indicate that the content and quality of information may not be as important as the 
source of the information in the shaping of policy preferences associated with fracking for both 
local policy elites and the general public. 
From a practical perspective, this article demonstrates that attempting to shape the 
attitudes or perceptions of an individual via providing information is likely to be unsuccessful 
when the source of that information is not perceived as value-congruent with the receiver. 
Importantly, this has potential ramifications for the dissemination and adoption of accurate 
policy-relevant information. While not explicitly tested here, the results imply that information 
quality may, ultimately, be irrelevant in regard to the utilization of that information within 
decision-making. Indeed, this issue can be seen with the recent utilization of proclaiming 
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disagreeable information to be “fake news” with no other considerations of the content of the 
information addressed. Of particular note is the distinction between local policy elites and the 
general public, with local policy elites’ benefit-risk perceptions associated with fracking being 
more strongly driven by distrust in information, as compared to the general public. Is this finding 
due to the increased cognitive sophistication of local policy elites as compared to the general 
public causing elites to more accurately and consistently express their policy-related values, or 
is it a result of the policy issue itself (i.e. hydraulic fracturing) and the argumentation around this 
issue? While, perceived benefit-risk levels were statistically the same for both local policy elites 
and the general public, the means by which the two groups cognitively reached those 
evaluations were distinct, demonstrating that efforts to persuade, or simply provide information, 
may need to be different depending on the audience. Specifically, information that is perceived 
to come from a value-incongruent source may be relatively neutral in terms of shaping public 
opinion. However, for local policy elites, presenting information that is perceived to be value-
incongruent to the receiver may very well have the opposite of the intended effect, moving the 
individual away from the conclusions suggested by the information. With increasing partisanship 
across the political landscape, the importance of understanding and accounting for the nuances 
of how the perceived value-congruence between a receiver of information and its source shapes 
the efficacy of that information cannot be understated.  
 The second paper introduces the concept of perceived value congruence and its 
moderating role in the relationship between cultural value predispositions and trust in 
information from policy-relevant sources in two distinct contexts – Arkansas and Oregon. 
Particularly for egalitarianism and individualism, results indicate that 1) the degree to which a 
local policy elite views their values as compatible with the values of their community impacts the 
role of cultural value predispositions in shaping trust in information from policy-relevant sources 
and 2) the pattern of these relationships are distinct between the Arkansas and Oregon 
contexts. These findings indicate that it is not only the values that an individual personally holds 
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that shapes trust in information, but the perceived fit of those values with others in the 
community and the specific context the individual is situated in that together shape levels of 
trust in a given source of information.  
 Broadly, this article demonstrates that the decision-making process regarding the same 
policy issue can be distinct among individuals with similar values across different contexts. From 
a practical perspective this indicates that, even for an issue that can be viewed as a national 
level policy issue, the process by which individuals develop their opinions can be distinct in 
different policy subsystems. Thus, a more fine-grained approach to persuasion is likely 
necessary for the information exchanged to achieve maximum efficacy. While not explicitly 
examined, this provides important implications for future research related to the dynamics of 
advocacy coalitions – particularly in terms of advocacy coalitions that share the same goals but 
are nested in different policy subsystems. Strategies utilized successfully for an advocacy 
coalition in one policy subsystem may not be efficacious in another policy subsystem due to the 
distinct cognitive processes of the members within the two coalitions. Thus, in examining the 
dynamics of advocacy coalition behavior, the cognitive processes of individuals within the policy 
subsystem need to be further investigated in order to better understand the extent to which 
results are generalizable (or not) to other policy subsystems, both at the micro and meso levels 
of analysis. Finally, the results of the second article provide important methodological 
implications. That the relationship between an individual’s personal values and trust in 
information is conditioned on how the individual views their values to align with the values in 
their community, as well as the specific environment that the individual is nested in, indicates 
that research utilizing national samples may miss important significant relationships, as the 
nuanced differences based on place, and how an individual views themselves to be nested into 
that place (e.g. perceived value congruence) may “wash out” when testing for statistical 
significance. By not appropriately accommodating for moderating variables in research projects, 
163 
 
the incidence of both Type I and Type II errors is likely to be greater, particularly when 
attempting to apply results to specific contexts (e.g. a specific policy subsystem). 
The third paper examined how the combination of culturally nuanced narratives and 
knowledge (in)congruence impact the relationship between cultural value predispositions and 
fracking policy preferences among local policy elites in Arkansas and Oregon. For those 
demonstrating knowledge humility, cultural value predispositions were not found to be 
significantly related to fracking policy preferences across narrative conditions. For those 
demonstrating knowledge hubris, cultural value predispositions consistently predicted fracking 
policy preferences. Further, the pattern of relationships between cultural value predispositions 
and fracking policy preferences was distinct across culturally nuanced narratives among local 
policy elites demonstrating knowledge hubris.  
 From a theoretical perspective, this article provides insights into the Narrative Policy 
Framework as well as theories of motivated reasoning, identity-protective cognition, and Cultural 
Theory. For the NPF, the results in this article demonstrate that a focus on direct effects of 
narratives may understate the utility of the NPF in explaining the policy process. Specifically, 
while the culturally nuanced narratives did not have any direct effect on fracking policy 
preferences, they did have a meaningful effect on the relationship between cultural value 
predispositions and fracking policy preferences. Thus, theory within the NPF should broaden to 
include narratives as moderators, particularly focusing on individual characteristics of those 
receiving narratives, such as knowledge (in)congruence levels and personality.  Regarding 
insights into theories of decision-making (e.g. motivated reasoning, identity-protective cognition) 
and values (e.g. Cultural Theory), the finding that knowledge (in)congruence moderates the 
relationship between cultural value predispositions and fracking policy preferences (i.e. for those 
expressing knowledge humility values were not a significant predictor of fracking policy 
preferences but were a significant predictor for those demonstrating knowledge hubris) is of 
particular importance. For example, this finding indicates the need to examine conditions under 
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which identity-protective cognition is activated, or not activated. Is it the case that those 
demonstrating knowledge humility do not have a policy-relevant identity to protect, thus 
rendering cultural value predispositions statistically irrelevant in shaping fracking policy 
preferences? What are the origins of inflated versus deflated self-knowledge assessments? The 
results of the current study indicate that more theorizing, as well as more empirical work, needs 
to be done to better explicate the role of knowledge (in)congruence in shaping attitudes, 
perceptions, and preferences.  
 Finally, these three articles together demonstrate the need for more nuanced 
methodological approaches to understanding the policy process, focusing on both the 
conceptualization and roles of variables and constructs, as well as the types of analyses that 
are appropriate to conduct in order to answer the research questions being addressed. The first 
article demonstrates that trust, typically utilized as a separate independent variable, is actually 
partially derived from cultural value predispositions and serves as a mediator of the relationship 
between values and benefit-risk perceptions. Thus, for example, utilizing trust as a control 
variable in statistical analyses may serve to artificially minimize the relationship between values 
and dependent variables of interest, providing inaccurate results and understandings of the role 
of cultural value predispositions in shaping outcomes of interest. The second and third articles 
demonstrate the methodological tradeoffs of choosing one analytical tactic versus another. In 
both articles, subsample analysis was utilized, comparing regression equations between each 
subsample to examine moderating effects. Alternatively, an interaction term could have 
theoretically been utilized for this examination. However, each type of analysis would, ultimately 
answer different questions. Utilizing an interaction term would test whether there were 
significant differences in the estimated effect size across levels of the independent variable of 
interest. Alternatively, the subsample analysis utilized here examines whether a statistically 
significant effect exists for different subgroups. The results found in this dissertation 
demonstrate the challenges that can arise from utilizing either method of analysis, thus 
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emphasizing the importance of selecting the appropriate analysis for the research question of 
interest. For example, in the third article, in some cases the estimated effect of a cultural value 
predisposition for those demonstrating knowledge hubris was not statistically different from the 
estimated effect for those demonstrating knowledge humility. However, in the knowledge 
humility subsample the estimated effect was not statistically significant. Thus, while there was 
no statistically significant interaction term, the interpretation of the results between the two 
groups is distinct (i.e. a significant predictor versus a non-significant predictor). It is possible that 
part of the challenge of replicating previous results stems from these types of methodological 
choices.  
 Together, these three articles provide insights into components of the decision-making 
processes associated with hydraulic fracturing, with a particular focus on the role of values in 
shaping benefit-risk perceptions, trust, and policy preferences. Importantly, the results indicate a 
need for more research, particularly more nuanced research, focusing on elaborating the 
decision-making processes associated with policy-making in order to better understand the 
means by which policies are developed, accepted, and instituted. 
 
 
 
